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ABSTRACT 
 
SEEING AND PERCEPTUAL CONTENT 
Ben Phillips 
 
Advisor: Jesse Prinz  
 
There are two widely held assumptions about perception: ascriber-independence (the 
view that the facts regarding what a subject perceives, as well as what her perceptual 
states represent, are independent of the interests of those attributing the relevant states 
to her), and determinacy (the view that perceptual content is relatively determinate). I 
challenge both of these assumptions, and develop a new approach to perceptual content, 
with implications for theories of mental content more broadly. In chapter one, I address 
the question of whether, in addition to low-level features, vision represents ordinary ob-
jects. I argue that there is just no fact of the matter. In chapter two, I defend a contex-
tualist account of object-seeing: one that illuminates the inscrutability thesis defended in 
chapter 1. Finally, in chapter three, I address the question of whether the contents of 
vision are object-dependent. I argue that it is simply indeterminate whether the particu-
lars we perceive enter into the contents of our perceptual states. I then address various 
worries about the indeterminacy thesis, arguing that we should embrace the view that 
there are multiple, equally acceptable, ways to assign contents to our perceptual experi-
ences.   
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Preface  
During the 1980s and 1990s, psychosemantics was in full swing. Big hitters such as 
Dretske, Millikan, and Fodor all attempted to naturalize semantic content by appealing 
to naturalistically respectable conditions. However, as things stand, there is a sense—at 
least in many circles—that the whole enterprise was somewhat of a failure. Of course, 
this is probably due, in part, to sociological factors: philosophy is certainly not immune 
to fads. Nonetheless, I think there is also a philosophical reason that psychosemantics 
lost momentum. In brief, I think there is a widespread suspicion that standard ap-
proaches to naturalizing mental content are beset by a systemic inability to overcome 
various indeterminacies. For instance, there is Quine’s inscrutability thesis; Kripken-
stein’s rule-following considerations; Fodor’s disjunction problem; Devitt and Sterelney’s 
qua problem; and the various indeterminacies that purportedly plague teleosemantic 
theories of content.    
 In light of these persistent indeterminacies, some philosophers have called for a radi-
cally different approach. For instance, proponents of the so-called phenomenal inten-
tionality program have suggested that we ground mental content in phenomenology. 
More strongly, proponents of the phenomenology-first approach often claim that the 
roots of content determinacy are grounded in phenomenology. I’m dubious of these sorts 
of claims for a number of reasons. More importantly, though, I think that pessimism 
about naturalistic theories of content is unwarranted. But that is not because I think 
that the indeterminacy worries mentioned above can all be resolved by adding bells and 
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whistles to pre-existing theories. Rather, it is because I do not regard many of them as 
serious worries to begin with. Philosophers of mind (and language) have—in my estima-
tion—grossly underestimated the degree to which the content of a mental state can be 
indeterminate, whilst still playing the explanatory roles that we would want it to.  
 The issues that I pursue in this dissertation can thus be seen as forming part of a 
much larger project that aims to show why we should be willing to live with (a surpris-
ing degree of) indeterminacy. Vision is a good place to start, for it is certainly tempting 
to think that (barring unusual cases), our visual experiences are crisp and determinate. 
When you look at a ripe banana, it is easy to be seduced into thinking that your experi-
ence determinately represents a yellow, banana-shaped, thing. How could it be other-
wise?! It is this kind of temptation that I aim to resist in what follows.    
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Introduction 
What kinds of objects do we see? Suppose you are watching a plane that is about to 
disappear behind a thick black cloud. At present, the plane is in “full view”: that is to 
say, the cloud is not occluding any part of the plane just yet. What do you see? Do you 
see the plane itself? Do you only see its facing surface? Perhaps you see both of these 
things. If you do see both of these things then what about the other fusions of which 
they are arguably parts? For instance, do you see the object that is composed of the 
plane and Vladimir Putin’s left nostril?   
Now consider what you see once the front half of the plane has been occluded by the 
cloud. Do you still see the plane itself? Do you only see its back half? Perhaps you only 
see the facing surface of its back half. What do you see when the only part of the plane 
that is not occluded by the cloud is the very tip of its tail?  
 In addressing these kinds of questions, philosophers have—unsurprisingly—offered an 
array of different answers. Both Broad (1925, 149) and Moore (1953, 34) argue that, 
strictly speaking, we only ever see the facing surfaces of objects. On their view, to say 
that one sees ordinary 3D objects is just loose talk.  
Jackson (1977) disagrees, arguing that we do see ordinary 3D objects. This is be-
cause, according to him, we see them in virtue of seeing their “reasonably substantial” 
parts (e.g. their facing surfaces). More recently, Uriah Kriegel (2009) has defended a 
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similar view according to which one sees an ordinary 3D object just in case one sees a 
“highly integrated” part of it.   
 Other theorists, such as Pylyshyn (2003, 2007) and Burge (2009, 2010), agree that we 
see 3D objects; but that is not because we see them in virtue of seeing their parts. 
Rather, it is because the visual system represents them. According to Pylyshyn (2003, 
2007) the visual system contains a “visual-indexing” mechanism, whose job it is to keep 
track of environmental particulars by maintaining referential contact with them over 
time. Importantly, these indexes refer to objects without encoding any of their proper-
ties: they are therefore akin to pure demonstratives (e.g. “this” and “that”). On this ver-
sion of the representational view, seeing an object is tantamount to visually indexing it; 
however, as we shall see, Pylyshyn is not exactly clear on what kinds of particulars are 
referred to by visual indexes.   
Burge (2009, 2010) denies that vision picks out environmental objects by deploying 
pure demonstratives, arguing that in order to visually perceive an object, one’s visual 
system must accurately encode some of its properties. More specifically, according to 
Burge, in order to see a 3D object, one’s visual system must, at the very least, accu-
rately represent that object as a cohesive, bounded, and spatiotemporally continuous 
body.  
 Even though the approaches outlined above contain genuine insights, I think that 
there is an important ambiguity in the answers they give to our original question: 
namely, “What kinds of objects do we see?” The ambiguity stems from a failure to 
clearly distinguish between the following key questions:  
 
(1) What do our visual states represent?  
(2) What are the consequences, if any, for the notion of object-seeing that earns 
its explanatory keep in vision science?  
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(3) What are the consequences, if any, for the folk notion of object-seeing?  
(4) What are the differences, if any, between the folk notion of object-seeing and 
the one that earns its keep in vision science? 
  
In answering these questions, I challenge what I take to be two widely held assumptions 
about visual perception. According to the first, which objects one qualifies as seeing is 
an ascriber-independent affair: that is to say, the interests of ascribers have no role to 
play in determining which environmental particulars the subject qualifies as seeing. Ac-
cording to the received view, whether S counts as seeing an environmental particular, O, 
is solely determined by the head-world relations that obtain between S’s visual experi-
ence and O (e.g. causal relations). I argue that both the folk notion of object-seeing, and 
the one that earns its explanatory keep in vision science, are interest-relative.1  
 According to the second assumption, visual states have relatively determinate exten-
sions. I argue that visual states are indeterminate in two important, and surprising, 
ways. First, I argue that there is no fact of the matter as to whether they represent ob-
jects, or, just their facing portions. More carefully, I argue that the contents of visual 
states are indeterminate as between the following candidates: ordinary 3D objects; the 
surfaces of ordinary 3D objects; and the facing surfaces of ordinary 3D objects. Second, I 
argue that there is no fact of the matter as to whether the objects we see enter into the 
                                                
1 The notion of object-seeing that I’m concerned with in this dissertation is to be clearly dis-
tinguished from other notions of seeing. These other notions include fact-seeing, property-seeing, 
and phenomenological seeing. Fact-seeing involves seeing that something is the case, e.g. seeing 
that Trump’s hair is flailing in the wind. Property-seeing involves seeing properties of objects, 
e.g. seeing the shape and motion of trump’s hair. Both fact-seeing and property-seeing are fac-
tive, whereas, phenomenological seeing is not. For example, even though Macbeth was halluci-
nating, he still qualified as “seeing” a dagger before him in the phenomenological sense of the 
term. See Dretske (1969, 1990) for a detailed discussion of these other notions of seeing.   
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contents of our visual states: in other words, it is indeterminate whether visual states 
have object-dependent contents.     
 Rejecting the assumptions described above is theoretically interesting in its own 
right: as we shall see, traditional debates in the philosophy of perception are premised 
on the claim that they are true. But rejecting these assumptions is also interesting be-
cause, as I will argue, there are important connections between interest-relativity and 
indeterminacy. It is my contention that one of the reasons that the indeterminacies I’m 
positing have gone unnoticed is that the explanatory interests of ascribers (including 
both vision scientists and the folk) often make a given content-assignment—among the 
group of equally acceptable ones—salient. What looks like a visual state with determi-
nate content is, in fact, a state with various equally acceptable interpretations, one of 
which has been made salient in the ascriber’s explanatory context. In fact, to my mind, 
this tendency to mistake a merely salient content-assignment for a uniquely correct one 
is endemic to the philosophy of mind (but that is a topic for a future project!).  
The structure of the dissertation is as follows. In chapter 1, I address the question of 
what our visual states represent. In doing so, I start by reviewing empirical evidence for 
the thesis that vision houses object-representations—not just representations of low-level 
features, such as colors, 2D-shapes, texture, and motion. In particular, I review studies 
of amodal surface completion, volume completion, multiple-object tracking, and vision-
guided action, arguing that the empirical data do not adjudicate between the various 
candidate-extensions mentioned above: namely, 3D objects; surfaces of 3D objects; and 
facing surfaces of 3D objects. Given that the (facing) surface of an object is an unde-
tached part of it, my view bears a close resemblance to Quine’s (1960, 1969) thesis that 
reference is inscrutable: a thesis that is almost always pitched at the level of language 
and thought. I argue that even if reference is scrutable at the level of language and 
thought, it does not follow that visual reference is scrutable as well.  
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Having argued for the inscrutability of visual reference, I then draw consequences for 
the nature of object-seeing. If visual reference is inscrutable, it seems to follow that 
there is no fact of the matter concerning which of the candidate objects (listed above) 
we see. I argue that even though this is a surprising thesis, we can explain the intuition 
that we determinately see ordinary objects, as well as their facing portions, by constru-
ing the folk as contextualists about object-seeing: as far as the folk notion goes, we de-
terminately see ordinary objects and their facing portions, but only relative to an as-
criber’s context.   
 In chapter 2, I go on to provide a detailed defense of the view that the folk are con-
textualists about object-seeing. In particular, I argue that, according to the folk, 
whether one counts as seeing O over and above its facing portion varies according to the 
interests of those ascribing the state of seeing to S. In fact, I go ever further than this, 
arguing that whether S qualifies as seeing the facing portion of O is a context-sensitive 
affair as well. Having made my case for the context-sensitivity of the folk notion of ob-
ject-seeing, I then address two challenges. According to the first challenge, only a con-
text-insensitive notion of object-seeing is fit to play the explanatory roles that philoso-
phers of perception have traditionally been concerned with. According to the second, in 
order to ascertain what object-seeing is really like, we must uncover the notion that 
earns its keep in vision science, and there is no guarantee that the notion we uncover 
will be a context-sensitive one. I argue that neither challenge is compelling: the folk no-
tion of object-seeing and the one that earns its keep in vision science are both context-
sensitive.  
 Finally, in chapter 3, I address the question of whether perceptual content is object-
dependent: an issue I remain neutral on in chapters 1 and 2. According to generalists, 
the content of a perceptual state is completely independent of the facts concerning 
which objects, if any, the subject happens to perceive. Similarly, the generalist also 
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claims that whether the subject’s state counts as accurate or not is completely inde-
pendent of these same facts. Particularists disagree. According to them, the accuracy 
conditions of the subject’s state can only be satisfied by objects she perceives. In fact, 
some particularists go even further than this and endorse the stronger claim that if the 
subject perceives an object then that object enters into the content of her experience. I 
argue that neither side of the generalism/particularism debate is right. What generalists 
and particularists are providing us with are equally acceptable ways of assigning con-
tents (and accuracy conditions) to our perceptual experiences. It is simply indeterminate 
whether the objects we perceive are represented by our perceptual experiences.  
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Chapter 1 
Object-seeing and the inscrutability of visual reference 
1.1 Introduction  
Imagine you are ten-pin bowling. Your gaze is centered on the middle pin as you lower 
your arm to release the ball. What exactly do you see? Do you see the pin itself? Do 
you merely see its facing surface? Do you see both? The question of whether we see or-
dinary objects or just their facing surfaces is an old one. Broad (1925) and Moore (1953) 
both endorse the view that, strictly speaking, we only ever see facing surfaces. Jackson 
(1977) defends the intuitive view that we see both ordinary objects and their facing sur-
faces: this is because, for Jackson, we see ordinary objects in virtue of seeing their facing 
surfaces. Clarke (1965), Dretske (1969), and Neta (2007) all give contextualist answers: 
relative to some contexts, you count as seeing the object itself, while relative to others, 
you only count as seeing its facing portion.   
 Related to the question of what we see is the question of what our visual states rep-
resent. In the last few decades, findings in vision science have been converging on the 
view that the visual system represents objects, not just an array of low-level features. 
For instance, in a series of studies, Pylyshyn (2001, 2003, 2006, 2007) has argued that 
our capacity to track multiple objects is best explained by positing representations of 
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them in early vision. Further evidence comes from the fact that amodal completion—the 
process whereby we represent objects as having occluded (and unseen) parts—seems to 
occur in early and mid-level vision, before object recognition takes place (Rensink & 
Enns 1998; Sugita 1999). The environmental particulars that are represented by states 
that participate in these visual processes are often referred to as “visual objects.”     
 These two questions—the question of which kinds of particulars we see, and the ques-
tion of whether the visual system contains object-representations—are connected in an 
important way. For there are compelling reasons to think that seeing an object requires 
visually representing it in some manner or other (Dretske 1969; Burge 2009, 2010). On 
some versions of the representational view, seeing an object amounts to picking it out 
via a pure demonstrative (Pylyshyn 2003, 2007). On other versions of the view, it is 
necessary to accurately represent the object as having certain properties (Burge 2009, 
2010). If we adopt a representational account of seeing then the evidence, mentioned 
above, concerning the kinds of entities that our visual states represent can be brought to 
bear on the old question of whether we see objects, facing surfaces, or both.2    
 In this chapter, I will focus mainly on the question of what our visual states repre-
sent, for doing so will enable us to shed light on the traditional question of whether we 
see objects or just their facing surfaces: the issue I focus on in chapter 2. In particular, I 
will argue that as far as the empirical evidence goes, there is just no fact of the matter 
as to whether our visual states represent objects, their facing surfaces, or both. I will do 
                                                
2 Of course, not everyone agrees that perceiving an object requires visually representing it in 
some manner or other. So-called relationists (e.g. Campbell 2002, Travis 2004, Brewer 2007) 
deny that visual states are representational in the first place; rather, they are, fundamentally, 
relations to environmental entities. On this view, to see an object is to stand in a non-
representational relation to it. Schellenberg (2010, 2011) has argued—persuasively, I think—that 
one can accommodate the claim that perceptions are, fundamentally, relations to environmental 
objects, without denying that they are representational, for a perceptual representation might 
pick out an object via a demonstrative-like element. I take up the issue of whether visual states 
represent objects via demonstrative elements in chapter 3: in this chapter, I’ll remain neutral.   
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so by defending a variant of Quine’s (1960, 1969) famous argument for the inscrutability 
of reference. Quine’s thesis is almost always discussed as a thesis about the extensions of 
terms in language and thought. Famously, Quine argues that the term ‘rabbit’ is refer-
entially indeterminate as between the property of being a rabbit and the property of 
being an undetached-rabbit-part (two necessarily co-instantiated properties). However, 
similar considerations can be used to argue that there is no fact of the matter as to 
whether we visually represent ordinary objects or just their facing surfaces: after all, the 
facing surfaces of objects are undetached parts of them.  
If visual reference is inscrutable, and we accept a representational view of seeing, it 
would seem to follow that there is no fact of the matter as to whether we see ordinary 
objects or just their facing surfaces. But that is a surprising conclusion: it certainly 
seems as though we determinately see both ordinary objects and their facing surfaces. I 
allay this concern by offering two explanations of the folk intuition—explanations that 
are compatible with the inscrutability of visual reference.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In sect. 2, I review empirical evidence for 
the claim that we visually represent objects (not just an array of low-level properties, 
such as colors). In sect. 3, I argue that the data do not adjudicate between the view that 
the states in question represent objects, and the alternative according to which they 
represent just their facing surfaces. In sect. 4, I address the worry that if thoughts have 
determinate extensions, perceptual states must have determinate extensions as well. I 
argue that there is no compelling reason to accept this inference. In sect. 5, I respond to 
the worry that we can only explain the fine-grained actions that we perform on objects 
if the visual states that mediate them determinately pick out ordinary 3D bodies. In 
sect. 6, I address first-person considerations, arguing that they do not provide us with 
any evidence against the visual inscrutability thesis. Finally, in sect. 7, I draw conse-
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quences for the traditional debate concerning whether we see objects or just their facing 
surfaces, anticipating the detailed discussion of this issue in chapter 2. 
    
1.2 Evidence for object-representations in vision  
Over the past few decades, findings in vision science have been converging on the view 
that the visual system contains representations of cohesive, bounded, and spatiotempo-
rally continuous particulars—not just representations of low-level features such as color, 
shape, texture, and motion. In what follows, I review what I take to be the most com-
pelling pieces of evidence accrued by vision scientists.    
 
1.2.1 Amodal completion and visual search tasks 
Consider figure 1. In (a) you see a notched circle, whereas, in (b), you seem to see a 
complete circle, partially occluded by a square. This process of perceiving objects as 
having occluded parts is known as amodal completion. 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b)   
       Fig. 1 Amodal completion        
 
Rensink and Enns (1998) carried out an experiment in which they asked subjects to 
search for the notched circle among a field of distractors. For instance, try to find the 
notched circle in figures 2 and 3 below.  
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          Fig. 2 Visual search task: version 1 
 
 
               
          Fig. 3 Visual search task: version 2 
 
What Rensink and Enns found is that it is harder to locate the notched circle in 2 than 
it is in 3. They found that in 3, the task is easy, yielding a parallel search outcome: that 
is to say, there was little or no increase in search time as the number of distractors in-
creased. In contrast, they found that 2 yields a serial search outcome: that is to say, 
there was a linear increase in difficulty as the number of distractors increased. Why is 
this the case?   
The most straightforward explanation is that amodal completion is a pre-attentive 
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process that occurs in parallel vision.3 When you examine figure 3, early visual processes 
parse the scene into an array of visual objects containing a notched circle: that notched 
circle is thus available for attention to glom on to. On the other hand, when you exam-
ine figure 2, early visual processes have parsed the scene into an array of visual objects 
that only contain complete circles (and squares): the missing part of the notched circle 
has been filled in. As far as the visual system is concerned, there is just no notched cir-
cle for attention to glom on to in figure 2.  
 For our purposes, the key point is that amodal completion appears to be a perceptual 
phenomenon. This is evidenced by the fact that it seems to occur pre-attentively, as a 
result of parallel processing: a type of processing that is widely seen as a marker of early 
perception.4 Thus given that amodal completion involves the representation of objects-
with-partially-occluded-parts, this amounts to evidence for the view that the visual sys-
tem represents objects, not just an array of low-level features.  
 
1.2.2 The automatic spread of attention    
Another piece of evidence for the view that vision houses object-representations con-
cerns the automatic spread of attention. Consider figure 4 below.      
 
                                                
3 The term “pre-attentive” must be used with caution. Single cell recordings in animals (De-
simone & Duncan 1995) and functional imaging in humans (Kastner & Ungerleider 2000) have 
shown that many levels of processing (including processing within primary visual cortex) can be 
modulated by top-down selective attention. See Raftopoulos (2009, ch 1) for a very careful dis-
cussion of the relationship between attentional mechanisms and the representation of objects in 
early vision—Raftopoulos' approach is amenable to the inscrutability thesis that I defend below.   
4 For discussions of the widely held view that parallel processing is a key marker of early vi-
sion, see the following: Treisman (1985); Raftopoulos (2009); and Healey & Enns (2012).    
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                     Fig. 4 The automatic spread of attention  
 
In a series of trials, Egly, Driver & Rafal (1994) cued the subject to the end of one of 
the bars (labeled ‘C’ above). Immediately after being cued, the subject’s task was to 
detect a darkening at the end of one of the bars. Subjects were much faster at detecting 
the darkening if it occurred at the other end of the same bar (marked ‘S’), rather than 
the end of a different bar (marked ‘D’).  
The fact that the distance from C to S is the same as the distance from C to D shows 
that there is a same-object advantage. What is happening is that the subject’s attention 
is spreading out from the cue to the boundaries of the object in question, which is fur-
ther evidenced by the fact that it happens even if the bar that contains the cue is par-
tially occluded (as in 4(b)). Again, the most straightforward explanation is that objects 
are represented by the visual system pre-attentively, before any of them are selectively 
attended to for further processing. 
 
1.2.3 The neural basis of amodal completion   
Further evidence for the thesis that vision contains object-representations comes from 
investigations into the neural correlates of amodal completion. Numerous studies suggest 
that amodally completed figures are represented by bottom-up cell activations early on 
in visual processing.   
For instance, using single cell recordings, Sugita (1999) found that orientation-
 14 
selective cells in the primary visual cortices of Japanese monkeys are sensitive to facts 
concerning occlusion. Subjects were presented with two vertical lines, separated by a 
grey patch (as in figure 5).   
    
   
      
 
              
 
                              Fig 5. Partially occluded bar 
 
When the patch was presented in such a fashion that it appeared to lie behind (or on 
the same plane as) the vertical line segments, the cell in question did not respond. How-
ever, when the patch was presented in such a way that it appeared to lie in front of the 
two line segments—so that it appeared to occlude a single bar—there was a significant 
response. Moreover, the response was similar to the one obtained when the cell was ex-
posed to a single unoccluded bar. Sugita (1999, 271) concludes that “border completion 
is carried out in very early stages of visual processing.” Further studies utilizing both 
single-cell recordings and brain imaging all converge on the view that amodal comple-
tion is a visual process.5    
 
1.2.4 Volume completion  
The studies I have described so far all involve 2D surface completion, but what about 
3D volume completion? If the only compelling evidence for visual object-representations 
                                                
5 For further studies utilizing single-cell recordings, see Bakin et al. (2000), as well as Bushnell 
et al. (2011). For a recent brain imaging study, see van Lier & Gerbino (2015).  
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concern representations of objects’ front surfaces, one might be tempted to side with 
Broad (1925) and Moore (1953) in drawing the conclusion that these are the only kinds 
of particulars that we ever see. However, there are compelling reasons for thinking that 
we visually represent the volumetric properties of ordinary 3D objects.     
For instance, when you look at a bowling ball, its front surface occludes its rear sur-
face. Nonetheless, from a phenomenological point of view, it is plausible that you visu-
ally experience the ball’s sphericality—a volumetric property that requires a form of 
amodal completion over and above 2D surface completion.  
 In contrast to the principles of 2D surface completion—which have been widely stud-
ied—the principles of volume completion are less well understood.6 Nonetheless, apart 
from its phenomenological plausibility, the claim that volume completion is a visual 
phenomenon is well supported.    
 One reason for construing volume completion as a visual phenomenon concerns the 
fact that we complete the rear surfaces of self-occluding objects in a way that is imper-
vious to our beliefs about them. For instance, consider figure 6 below.  
 
    
                   Fig. 6 Volume completion  
                                                
6 See Nakayama et al. (1995) for an influential account of surface completion. For an influen-
tial account of volume completion, see Tse (1999). Tse defends a unified account of volume and 
surface completion in terms of principles of “merging volumes.” On his account, surface comple-
tion is simply a degenerate case of volume completion (1999, 64).  
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Even if, upon looking at A, you know that the rear surface of the mug is the way C de-
picts it as being, you cannot help but see its surface as continuing on smoothly around 
the back to enclose a mug-shaped volume (as depicted in B). This insensitivity to coun-
tervailing evidence suggests that volume completion is not a matter of acquiring post-
perceptual beliefs about the rear surfaces of objects; rather, it is a process that occurs 
within perception, before background beliefs are brought to bear.7 
 Another piece of evidence for the claim that volume completion is a visual phenome-
non comes from a consideration of the action-guiding role of vision (which I discuss, at 
length, in sect. 1.5). The famous patient D.F. cannot recognize most 3D objects (a con-
dition known as visual agnosia), and yet her ability to act on them remains intact to a 
significant degree: for example, she can pick up ordinary objects.8 But successfully pick-
ing up ordinary objects requires representations of their volumetric properties: unless 
D.F. represents the 3D shape of a cup, say, how can she wrap her fingers around it in 
the requisite fashion? This suggests that volume completion occurs within vision, up-
stream of those processes that are responsible for object-recognition.9  
  
1.2.5 Multiple-object tracking (MOT) 
Perhaps the most compelling evidence for the existence of visual object-representations 
comes from studies of multiple-object tracking (MOT). In a typical MOT experiment, 
subjects are shown a screen containing up to 8 identical figures. Initially, some of these 
figures are flashed so as to mark them off as figures-to-be-tracked. The subject is then 
                                                
7 See Nanay (2010) for an extended version of this argument.   
8 See James et al. (2003).   
9 See Tse (1999, 65) and Kubiluius et al. (2014) for similar arguments. See Marr & Nishihara 
(1978), as well as Biederman (1987), for influential accounts of the volumetric representations 
that serve as inputs to the process of object-recognition. Some theorists (e.g. Bayne 2009) claim 
that object recognition is a decidedly perceptual capacity: in what follows, I will remain neutral 
on this issue.   
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asked to track these targets as all 8 figures move along independent trajectories (see 
figure 7). At some point (5 to 10 seconds later) the motion stops and the subject is 
asked to indicate which figures were targets. Pylyshyn (2003, 223–32) has found that 
subjects are able to track 4–5 objects with an efficiency characteristic of parallel process-
ing. However, beyond 5, the capacity falls off sharply, with a profile characteristic of 
serial processing.10   
 
             Fig. 7 The multiple-object tracking paradigm  
 
The fact that a normal subject’s capacity to track up to 5 objects has a profile charac-
teristic of parallel processing suggests that the objects in question are being represented 
in early vision. Moreover, studies strongly suggest that subjects track objects independ-
ently of their color-, size-, shape-, and kind-properties. If subjects were tracking objects 
by visually representing these sorts of properties, we would expect performance to im-
prove when targets and distractors are differentiated in the relevant respects: but this is 
not borne out by experiments. This suggests that the representations in question are 
being tokened early on in visual processing (certainly, before object recognition occurs).        
In another study, Creem and Proffitt (2001) showed that if the semantic memory of 
normal subjects is tied up, their capacity to track objects is unaffected. For instance, 
                                                
10 See Howe et al. (2010) for a study that directly tests, and supports, the claim that MOT 
occurs via parallel processing.  
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subjects were asked to track a moving target on a screen while performing a semantic 
recall task. Performing this distractor task failed to impair their ability to track the tar-
get object(s), suggesting that tracking is a pre-cognitive capacity.  
Equally important as the fact that MOT appears to be a visual process is the fact 
that if targets fail to behave in ways characteristic of physical bodies, tracking breaks 
down. For instance, even though objects can be successfully tracked amidst changes in 
surface color, size, shape, and kind, tracking breaks down if the target fails to maintain 
either cohesiveness, the integrity of its boundaries, or spatiotemporal continuity. For 
example, if a target starts to behave like a liquid, with portions breaking off in a pour-
ing fashion, tracking breaks down.11 Tracking also breaks down if the target fails to 
move along a spatiotemporally continuous trajectory, e.g. if it disappears and then sud-
denly reappears on the other side of the screen. Finally, experiments have shown that 
subjects cannot track easily defined parts of objects. Scholl, Pylyshyn and Feldman 
(2001) found that when a target is merged with a distractor via a connecting line, sub-
jects are no longer able to track the target: instead, they track the composite object 
whose parts include target, distractor, and connecting line.    
All of these constraints on successful tracking strongly suggest that the visual repre-
sentations in play are keyed to cohesive, bounded, and spatiotemporally continuous par-
ticulars.  
   
1.3 The inscrutability of visual reference  
The experiments outlined above all provide evidence for the view that vision parses the 
scene into an array of visual objects. But what exactly are the contents of the relevant 
states? Must we construe them as representations of 3D bodies? Why not construe them 
as representations of the facing surfaces of 3D bodies?  
                                                
11 See Yantis (1998); Scholl & Pylyshyn (1999); and vanMarle & Scholl (2003).   
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1.3.1 Quinean inscrutability  
Given that the facing surfaces of objects are undetached parts of them, the question I’m 
posing here resembles Quine’s (1960, 1969) famous question about the extension of the 
term ‘rabbit.’ Quine argues that there are several ways of assigning extensions to our 
terms that are compatible with all of the relevant data. Consequently, there is just no 
fact of the matter as to which assignment is correct: reference is inscrutable. For in-
stance, there is no fact of the matter as to whether the term ‘rabbit’ refers to the set of 
rabbits, or, to the set of undetached-rabbit-parts: both candidates do equal justice to 
the relevant data.  
 More specifically, Quine’s (1960, 1969) argument has the following basic structure. 
First, we settle the facts concerning the truth-values of sentences in the language. Ac-
cording to Quine, the data that determine these facts are speakers’ dispositions to as-
sent to, and dissent from, these sentences. We then go about assigning extensions to 
sub-sentential terms in such a fashion that these truth-values are preserved. This is 
where the inscrutability kicks in, for according to Quine, there are multiple (equally 
acceptable) ways to assign referents to sub-sentential terms such that the truth-values 
of the sentences they constitute are thereby preserved.  
 For instance, take the sentence, “There is a rabbit.” This sentence is true in all and 
only those cases in which a rabbit is present. Thus we can assign the set of rabbits to 
the sub-sentential predicate ‘is a rabbit.’ However, given that being a rabbit and being 
an undetached-rabbit-part are necessarily co-instantiated, “There is a rabbit” is also true 
in all and only those cases in which an undetached-rabbit-part is present. We can there-
fore preserve the truth-value of “There is a rabbit” by assigning the set of undetached-
rabbit-parts to the predicate ‘is a rabbit.’   
 Before addressing the analogous thesis about visual reference, it is worth noting that 
many commentators reject Quine’s argument on the grounds that it assumes an unac-
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ceptable brand of linguistic behaviorism. For instance, Searle (1987) complains that 
Quine’s inscrutability thesis is premised on “extreme linguistic behaviorism,” the thesis 
that “the objective reality of meaning consists entirely of correlations between external 
stimuli and dispositions to verbal behavior” (1987, 126). 
 Now, my concern here is not with linguistic reference. Moreover, I will not contribute 
to the debate as to whether Quine’s original argument assumes an unpalatable form of 
linguistic behaviorism (I happen to think that it does not). Rather, I want to go about 
arguing that, as far as the relevant data are concerned, visual reference is indeterminate 
as between objects and their facing surfaces. In doing so, I will not assume any form of 
behaviorism. All I will assume is that (i) the relevant data are constituted by naturalis-
tically respectable facts, and (ii) our epistemic access to those facts is naturalistically 
respectable as well.  
With that in mind, I want to launch my argument for the inscrutability of visual ref-
erence by reconsidering the experimental findings reviewed above, for they constitute 
the primary source of evidence for the thesis that the visual system contains object-
representations.  
 
1.3.2 Amodal completion, the spread of attention, and inscrutability    
Reconsider Rensink and Enns’ (1998) experiment in which the subject searches for a 
notched circle among a field of distractors. Above, we said that the reason the subject 
finds it harder when presented with figure 2 is that her visual system is representing the 
target as a complete circle, not a notched one. But we can just as easily explain why she 
finds it harder by construing her visual system as representing the target as the facing 
portion of a partially occluded circle. In explaining why the subject finds it harder to 
locate the target in figure 2, the key point is that her visual system does not represent 
the target as a notched circle (i.e. as a pacman shape). Representing the target as a 
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(partially occluded) circle is one way for this to occur: representing it as the facing por-
tion of a complete circle is another.  
Similarly, reconsider the spread of attention. Above, we explained the same-object 
advantage exhibited in Egly, Driver, and Rafal’s (1994) study by positing pre-attentive 
representations of objects over which the subject’s attentional spotlight spreads. But we 
can just as easily explain the results by positing pre-attentive representations of the fac-
ing surfaces of objects: that is to say, we can construe subjects’ attention as spreading 
out over the facing surfaces of objects, such as the bars in figure 4.    
 What goes for surface completion goes for volume completion too. For instance, when 
I look at the front surface of a sphere, there are two ways to assign an extension to my 
visual state. According to one, I represent the facing surface of the sphere as such: ac-
cording to another, I represent the sphere as such. Both assignments enable us to ex-
plain my performances on those versions of the tasks discussed above, where the targets 
are 3D, as opposed to 2D.12   
 
1.3.3 MOT and inscrutability   
In assessing whether MOT is compatible with the inscrutability thesis that I’m seeking 
to defend, it is important to distinguish between representations of properties, and rep-
resentations of the particulars that instantiate them (an issue I take up in much more 
detail in chapter 3).    
Take Pylyshyn’s account of MOT. According to him, the capacity to track multiple 
objects is enabled by a mechanism he calls “visual indexing” (2003, ch. 5). Importantly, 
these visual indexes refer to objects and maintain referential contact with them over 
                                                
12 It is important to realize that both 2D surfaces and 3D objects have facing portions. Thus 
even if surface completion occurs prior to volume completion in order of visual processing, both 
representations will exhibit the kind of indeterminacy that I’m positing.   
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time, but not in virtue of encoding their properties. Pylyshyn’s visual indexes are thus 
akin to pure demonstratives (e.g. “this” and “that”). Pylyshyn’s core motivation for con-
struing visual indexes in this way stems from the finding—explained above—that track-
ing seems to proceed independently of those states that represent the color-, size-, 
shape-, and kind-properties of target objects.    
Pylyshyn sometimes refers to visual indexes as “FINSTs,” which stands for “FINgers 
of INSTantiation.” He elaborates on this metaphor as follows:  
 
… we initially viewed this mechanism in terms of the metaphor of keeping “fingers” 
on certain objects, so as to be able to refer to them, direct inquiries to them, or to 
move attention to them. If you imagine the cartoon character “Plastic Man” sticking 
long flexible fingers on a number of objects, and imagine that the fingers themselves 
cannot sense any properties of these objects directly but allows the individuated ob-
jects to be queried by attending to them, this captures the basic idea behind visual 
indexes. The term “instantiation” connotes the use of the indexes to bind mental par-
ticulars (or symbols) to objects, which then “instantiates” the variables. (2003, 206) 
 
Does Pylyshyn’s account leave any room for inscrutability?  
Suppose you successfully track the bowling ball as it rolls down the laneway. As the 
ball rotates, the part that constitutes its facing surface is constantly changing. How 
could it be that the visual index in question, say V, enables you to track the ball as it 
rolls down the laneway if what V picks out at each moment is changing? In order to 
explain how you successfully tracked the ball, don’t we need to construe V as maintain-
ing referential contact with the same particular—namely, the ball—throughout?   
 Tempting as it is, I think this line of reasoning is mistaken. In assigning referents to 
visual indexes, the goal is to explain how a robust causal relation is maintained between 
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the visual system and objects in the world: even when, for example, those objects are 
rotating. And construing the referents of visual indexes as the facing surfaces of objects 
does nothing at all to undermine that explanatory goal. As long as the different facing 
surfaces that are successively picked out by a visual index are all facing surfaces of the 
very same object, the robust causal relation that we are after has been secured.   
To borrow Pylyshyn’s finger metaphor, suppose Plastic Man is keeping track of a 
spinning ball. His finger is always in contact with the ball, but the part that his finger is 
touching changes from moment to moment as the ball spins. It is precisely because Plas-
tic Man touches different parts of the same ball as it spins that he is able to keep track 
of it. In the same way, we can explain how the visual system keeps track of a spinning 
object even if we posit an index that refers to different facing portions of that object at 
different points throughout the tracking episode: as long as they are all facing portions 
of the very same object, successful tracking has been achieved.  
 Even if one is not convinced by this reply, consider the fact that the entire surface of 
an ordinary 3D body is an undetached part of it. As the body rotates, the part that 
constitutes its facing surface changes, but the part that constitutes its entire surface 
does not. The kinds of worries raised above therefore do not even arise for this candi-
date referent.       
What if we were to reject Pylyshyn’s approach and construe visual indexes as refer-
ring to tracked objects by encoding their properties? For instance, according to Burge 
(2009, 2010), a visual index, V, refers to an environmental particular, O, just in case (i) 
there is an appropriate causal relation between O and V, and (ii) V accurately repre-
sents O as having certain features. Will any features do? Burge elaborates as follows:  
 
Although shape, color, and kind are sometimes not tracked when objects are tracked, 
if the indexes pick out genuinely perceived objects they must (and do) carry mini-
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mum coding of a perceivable type, however generic, that distinguishes figure from 
ground. (2009, 31) 
 
Elsewhere, he elaborates as follows:    
 
… spatial boundedness, spatial integrity, and continuity in motion are properties 
whose representation guides indexes for bodies. (2010, 456) 
 
For instance, simplifying things a little, suppose V is of the form THAT COHESIVE, 
BOUNDED, BODY. In that case, V refers to O just in case O is a cohesive and 
bounded body, and it was also an appropriate cause of V.    
If we adopt this alternative to Pylyshyn’s view, we can easily explain MOT by con-
struing the attributive elements of visual indexes as being referentially indeterminate as 
between ordinary bodies and their facing surfaces. For instance, according to the latter 
reference scheme, if I’m tracking a rotating sphere then V will be along the lines of 
THAT FACING-PORTION-OF-COHESIVE-BOUNDED-BODY—a complex demon-
strative that picks out different facing portions of the very same body as it rotates.  
 
1.3.4 Re-identification and inscrutability   
One might worry that our capacity to re-identify objects during episodes of tracking can 
only be explained if we construe visual indexes as referring to objects themselves, not 
their facing surfaces. It is well known that humans, and various non-human animals, 
can track objects that disappear and then reappear from behind occluders.13 For in-
                                                
13 See Kellman & Spelke (1983); Spelke (1990); and Spelke, Kestenbaum, Simons, & Wein 
(1995).  
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stance, suppose that someone walks in front of me as I’m watching the bowling ball roll 
towards the pins. My view of the ball is momentarily blocked, but as soon as the offend-
ing party moves on, I’m able to re-identify the ball and continue tracking it. How could 
this be if the ball is rotating—the index in question thereby failing to pick out the very 
same object both before and after occlusion occurs?   
 There are various things to say in reply to this challenge. First, if the datum that 
requires explanation here is the capacity to track an object through temporary occlu-
sion, I fail to see why the visual index in question must pick out the object itself as op-
posed to its (current) facing surface. As we have already seen, maintaining referential 
contact with whichever part of the object happens to be its facing surface suffices for 
tracking that object: the fact that tracking can survive temporary occlusion does noth-
ing whatsoever to alter this point.  
 On the other hand, suppose the claim is that an ordinary subject has the capacity to 
visually represent an object as the same one that was experienced a moment ago. I’m 
not aware of any empirical evidence for the view that the visual system explicitly repre-
sents facts about the numerical identity of seen objects; however, even if we were to 
grant the claim that it does, this would not pose any problems for the inscrutability 
thesis. For instead of construing the subject’s visual state as representing the given ob-
ject, O, as being numerically identical to a previously experienced object, we can con-
strue her experience as representing O’s (current) facing surface as belonging to the very 
same object whose facing surface was visible a moment ago.14   
 Once again, even if one is not convinced by this reply, notice that we still have the 
entire surface of the object as a candidate referent. Given that what constitutes the en-
tire surface of the object does not change during rotation, there is no need to re-
                                                
14 Quine (1969, 33) himself suggests this sort of re-interpretation of the identity predicate 
when accommodating speakers’ answers to the question, “Is this gavagai the same as that?” 
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interpret the identity predicate in attempting to account for re-identification on this 
reference-scheme.  
 
1.3.5 Solidity and inscrutability  
Finally, one might hold the view that we visually represent bodies as solid—that is to 
say, as entities that cannot penetrate (and pass through) one another (Baillargeon 1987; 
Carey 2009; Burge 2010, 465; Huntley-Fenner, Carey, & Salimando 2002). But the sur-
faces of objects are not solid bodies that resist penetration, so doesn’t that rule them 
out as candidate extensions?  
 The reply to this worry should be familiar by now. As long as the facing surface of a 
solid body is represented as such—namely, as the facing surface of a solid body—that is 
all we need to accommodate the fact that normal subjects (as young as two months old) 
are surprised when the entities they are tracking pass through one another or behave 
like liquids and move in a pouring fashion.  
 
Summing up: there is a preponderance of evidence for the claim that vision parses the 
scene into an array of “objects,” but the conception of objecthood in play does not adju-
dicate between 3D bodies, their surfaces, and their facing surfaces. As far as fixing vis-
ual reference goes, there is thus nothing to choose between these candidates.  
 
1.4 Visual inscrutability and cognitive consumption    
Up until this point, I have been focusing exclusively on visual states, but what about 
those states tokened downstream in cognition? Perhaps there are independent reasons 
for regarding them as possessing determinate extensions. If so, would that provide us 
with reasons for regarding the visual states that give rise to them as possessing determi-
nate extensions too?  
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 As I see it, there are three versions of this worry. According to the first, there are 
arguments for the view that linguistic expressions and thoughts have determinate exten-
sions, which apply with equal force to the perceptual case. According to the second, vis-
ual object-representations are conceptual. Thus, if the concepts that are tokened in 
thought have determinate extensions, so must the concepts tokened upstream in vision. 
According to the third version of the worry, perceptual demonstrative thoughts inherit 
their referents from the perceptual states that cause them. Thus, if perceptual demon-
strative thoughts have determinate referents, so must the perceptual states that give 
rise to them. Let’s consider each worry in turn. 
 
1.4.1 Fodor’s argument for the scrutability of reference  
In an influential reply to Quine’s inscrutability challenge, Fodor (1994, 65) asks us to 
consider a figure of the following form: 
 
 
  
 
 
                        
                  Fig. 8 Intersection of square and triangle 
 
Notice that point A is an undetached part of both the triangle and the square. Thus, if 
we assign the set of undetached-triangle-parts to ‘is a triangle,’ the sentence “A is a tri-
angle” comes out true. Similarly, if we assign the set of undetached-square-parts to ‘is a 
square,’ the sentence “A is a square” comes out true. The problem with this reference 
scheme, though, is that it fails to preserve the truth-values of other sentences in the 
 
A 
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language. An ordinary English speaker will clearly reject the sentence, “A is both a 
square and a triangle,” and yet it is true on the non-standard interpretation. It follows 
that either ‘is a triangle’ does not have the set of undetached-triangle-parts as its exten-
sion or ‘is a square’ does not have the set of undetached-square-parts as its extension (or 
both).       
As Fodor points out (1994, 74–7), this solution to Quine’s challenge assumes that 
purely informational theories of content are false, for it requires us to construe the infer-
ential role of the predicate-conjunction symbol as (partly) fixing the extensions of our 
predicates. More specifically, we assumed above that because “A is both a square and a 
triangle” is false, either ‘is a triangle’ does not refer to the set of undetached-triangle-
parts or ‘is a square’ does not refer to the set of undetached-square-parts. But there are 
non-standard reference-schemes on which “A is both a square and a triangle” comes out 
false, even though ‘is a triangle’ and ‘is a square’ are both assigned the non-standard 
extensions. According to one such scheme, ‘A’ is ambiguous, referring to the triangle in 
“A is both a square and a triangle”; to an undetached-square-part in “A is a square”; and 
to an undetached triangle-part in “A is a triangle.” This non-standard reference scheme 
preserves the fact that “A is both a triangle and a square” is false, even though ‘is a tri-
angle’ and ‘is a square’ are both assigned the non-standard extensions. How can we rule 
out this reference-scheme?  
Fodor (1994, 71) argues that we can do so by appealing to the fact that ordinary 
speakers will accept the inference from “A is a triangle” and “A is a square” to “A is both 
a triangle and a square.” If ordinary speakers accept this inference then it cannot be 
that “A” is ambiguous in the way envisaged above: if “A” were ambiguous in the way 
envisaged then speaker’s would reject the inference. It thus follows that ‘is a square’ and 
‘is a triangle’ have determinate extensions, in part, because of the inferential role of the 
predicate-conjunction symbol—or so the argument goes—and that clearly constitutes a 
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departure from purely informational semantics, where the extensions of predicates are 
fixed solely in terms of the causal-informational relations in which they stand to proper-
ties in the world.15  
1.4.2 Applying Fodor’s strategy to thoughts about 3D objects  
In order to see how Fodor’s strategy bears on visual reference, let’s start by applying it 
to those thoughts that, on the standard interpretation, pick out ordinary 3D objects 
(not their facing surfaces). Take the mental predicate ‘is a cube.’ According to the stan-
dard interpretation, this predicate picks out the set of cubes; whereas, on the deviant 
interpretation, it picks out the set of facing-surfaces-of-cubes. Now, the predicate ‘is a 
square’ is clearly compatible with the deviant interpretation: something can be both 
square-shaped and the facing surface of a cube. However, it is clearly incompatible with 
the standard interpretation: nothing can be both square-shaped and a cube.   
The problem for the Quinean is that if the cube in question is orientated in the right 
way, the sentence “That is both a cube and a square” will come out true on the interpre-
tation according to which ‘is a cube’ has the set of facing-surfaces-of-cubes as its exten-
sion. We should therefore draw the conclusion that the predicate ‘is a cube’ does not 
have the set of facing-surfaces-of-cubes as its extension—or so the argument goes.   
 
1.4.3 Fodor’s strategy and visual reference   
In posing the question of whether Fodor’s strategy can be used to undermine the thesis 
that visual reference is indeterminate, I will not take a stance on whether it works in the 
case of language and thought.16 Rather, I will simply assume—for the sake of argu-
                                                
15 See Fodor (1990) for a causal-informational theory of predicate reference.  
16 See Gates (1996) for a persuasive argument that Fodor’s argument is unsound. See also 
Wilcock’s (ms) persuasive critique, which develops an ingenious suggestion of David Rosen-
thal’s.  
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ment—that Fodor’s argument is sound and that we therefore have determinate thoughts 
about objects and their facing surfaces. Does it follow that the representations tokened 
upstream in vision possess this same determinacy?  
 For instance, could we implement Fodor’s strategy by appealing to the fact that in 
looking at a cube, an ordinary subject will dissent (in thought) from the claim that that 
is both a cube and a square? The problem with this strategy is that it would only un-
dermine the visual inscrutability thesis if we have already determined (i) which predi-
cate-types are tokened in vision, and (ii) that they are the same ones that figure down-
stream in thought. Unless (i) and (ii) have been established, we do not have the lever-
age that we need in order to go from the fact that the subject dissents (in thought) from 
the sentence, “That is both a cube and a square,” to the conclusion that the visual states 
tokened upstream have determinate extensions.          
 In other words, we can only use Fodor’s strategy to argue that visual states exhibit 
the determinacy of thoughts if we reject the view according to which those object-
representations in early vision that are implicated in MOT, and so on, are indeterminate 
as between objects and their facing surfaces; whereas, those states tokened downstream 
in cognition have determinate extensions. And the view that indeterminate visual repre-
sentations give rise to determinate representations downstream in cognition (and lan-
guage) is certainly coherent and plausible: in fact, it is a view that Fodor (2007) himself 
holds. More to the point, it is a view that takes work to argue against. Below I consider, 
and reject, two attempts to do so. 
  
1.4.4 The concepts-all-the-way-down argument  
According to the first argument, the contents of perception are conceptual in the sense 
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that they are apt to figure as the contents of cognitive states too.17 If this view of per-
ception is correct, what are the consequences for the visual inscrutability thesis? If we 
agree with Fodor in taking the concepts that constitute thoughts to have determinate 
extensions, and we also hold the view that visual states possess conceptual contents, 
there is a temptation to conclude that the concepts that figure in vision have determi-
nate extensions as well. For instance, if we suppose that in looking at the blue sphere, 
the content of my visual state has the concepts blueness and sphericality as constituents, 
and we are also convinced by Fodorian-style arguments for the view that these concepts 
have determinate extensions, it seems to follow that perceptual states have determinate 
extensions as well. 
 The problem with this objection is that it just begs the question against the propo-
nent of visual inscrutability. More specifically, it begs the question to insist that the 
concepts that are invoked in Fodorian-style arguments are the very same ones that fig-
ure in those stages of visual processing that parse the scene into cohesive, bounded, and 
spatiotemporally continuous particulars. According to the proponent of visual inscruta-
bility, the empirical data do not adjudicate between the view that visual representations 
pick out objects, and the alternative according to which they pick out the facing sur-
faces of these objects. Moreover, according to the proponent of visual inscrutability, this 
holds true regardless of whether the visual representations in question are conceptual.18 
And if that is the case, it follows that those concepts—e.g. sphericality—that are ap-
pealed to in Fodorian-style arguments against Quine’s thesis are not the same ones that 
                                                
17 For a discussion of different ways to draw the conceptual/non-conceptual distinction, see 
Heck (2000, 2007) and Speaks (2005).   
18 Recall that studies of MOT and amodal completion strongly suggest that they are pre-
attentive and parallel processes that occur in early vision. This remains the case, regardless of 
whether one rejects the additional claim that they are also pre-conceptual processes.  
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are deployed during those processes that mediate multiple-object tracking; amodal com-
pletion; and so on.19  
 
1.4.5 The argument from demonstrative thought  
According to the second argument, perceptual demonstrative thoughts inherit their ref-
erents from the perceptual states that give rise to them.20 Thus if we are already com-
mitted to the view that perceptual demonstrative thoughts determinately pick out ordi-
nary objects (e.g. spheres) and determinately attribute properties to them (e.g. being 
spherical), it seems to follow that the perceptual states that give rise to them must have 
determinate extensions as well. More carefully, it seems to follow that perceptual states 
have singular elements that determinately pick out particulars, as well as attributive 
elements that determinately pick out properties: otherwise, how could the subject token 
a perceptual thought that determinately attributes a property to a unique object?   
 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to assess detailed views on how the referents of 
perceptual demonstratives thoughts are fixed. However, I want to suggest that we 
needn’t do so in order to defend the visual inscrutability thesis against the worry at 
hand. For it is far from clear why a visual state with indeterminate referents could not 
give rise to a perceptual thought with determinate ones.   
For instance, if something like Fodor’s objection to the inscrutability thesis—as it 
applies to language and thought—is sound, that gives us all the resources we need to 
explain how a thought with determinate referents can arise from a visual state with in-
determinate ones. To see why this is the case, recall that according to Fodor, no purely 
informational theory of content can secure referential determinacy: necessarily, terms 
                                                
19 Of course, another way to respond to the present objection would be to deny that the rele-
vant visual states possess conceptual contents. That is certainly the view of theorists such as 
Pylyshyn (2003), Burge (2009, 2010), and even Fodor himself (2007).  
20 For example, see Martin (2002). I discuss this particular issue in more detail in chapter 3.  
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that carry information about rabbits also carry information about their undetached 
parts. What we need is a theory according to which the extensions of our terms are 
fixed, in part, by the inferences in which they participate. And, as we saw above, the 
crucial inferences for Fodor are those involving predicate conjunction. But if that is 
what fixes the determinacy of language and thought, we now have a content-
determining story that is compatible with the thesis that indeterminate visual states 
give rise to determinate thoughts. According to the story I have in mind, whereas those 
visual states that mediate MOT, and so on, have indeterminate extensions, the determi-
nacy of the thoughts that they typically cause are grounded in the inferential transitions 
that they participate in downstream of MOT and amodal completion—namely, infer-
ences involving predicate conjunction and other logico-syntactic apparatus.21 
 
1.5 Inscrutability and vision-for-action  
One of the lessons from research on vision, action planning, and motor control in the 
last few decades is that an account of one is incomplete without an account of the oth-
ers: vision evolved because it is in the service of action. In heeding this lesson, what are 
the ramifications for visual reference? Is the action-guiding role of vision compatible 
with the thesis that visual representations are indeterminate as between 3D objects and 
their facing surfaces? Perhaps the array of actions we perform on objects is too fine-
grained for the visual inscrutability thesis to be tenable.  
 
                                                
21 Gareth Evans (1975) provides objections to Quine’s inscrutability thesis that are very simi-
lar in spirit to Fodor’s objection. In fact, Fodor (1994, 123) construes his own objection as a 
development of the insights found in Evans’ article. Burge (2010, 216–23) and Wilcock (ms) 
provide what I take to be persuasive reasons for rejecting Evans’ original arguments. But even if 
Evans’ arguments rule out certain deviant reference-schemes, and even if they are sound when it 
comes to language and thought, nothing he says goes any way towards ruling out the thesis that 
the visual states we are concerned with (e.g. those that mediate MOT) are indeterminate as 
between 3D bodies and their facing surfaces.    
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1.5.1 Object-manipulation and visual inscrutability 
Let’s work with a simple example: you are thirsty, and so you pick up the cup of water 
that is sitting on the table. In order to explain how you perform this action, must we 
construe the visual states that mediate it as having determinate extensions? Do they 
determinately refer to the cup, its facing surface, or perhaps both? In order to answer 
these questions, let’s trace out the key steps involved in performing the action. 
 First, you must select an appropriate target to perform the action on. In our exam-
ple, this means that you must recognize the cup as such: a ventral stream process that 
is widely thought to implicate inferior temporal cortex.22 Moreover, in order to recognize 
the cup as such, you must attend to it.  
 The second step involves the formulation of an appropriate action-plan: one that will 
achieve your goal of picking up the cup. Among other things, you must select which 
hand to use; an appropriate type of grip; and an appropriate type of posture. These are 
all choices that are made on the basis of processing within the ventral stream: bottom-
up information is clearly insufficient by itself. The selection of initial grip and lift forces 
is informed by past experiences with objects of the relevant visual appearance.23 For 
instance, my past experiences with cups, along with my recognition of the object as a 
cup, will aid me in selecting both an appropriate type of grip and an appropriate lift 
force, given my estimate of the cup’s 3D shape and weight.    
The fact that the detection of functional properties is involved in the planning stage 
makes it very likely that ventral stream processing is involved. Suppose the cup is, in 
fact, a coffee mug. Based on past experiences, as well as the fact that you recognize the 
cup as a coffee mug, you expect it to have a handle (one that is currently not visible). 
                                                
22 See Sato et al. (2013) for a discussion.   
23 Buckingham, Cant, & Goodale (2009).  
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You thus select an action that involves reaching around to the back of the mug where 
the handle is located.    
Already, at the planning stage, we have the makings of a challenge to the visual in-
scrutability thesis, for in attending to, recognizing, and representing key properties of 
the cup, aren’t you tokening determinate whole-cup-representations? For instance, your 
representation of the cup’s 3D shape is a key determinant of grip selection, and that is a 
feature of the cup, not its facing surface.   
There are various things to say in response to this challenge. First, we need to distin-
guish between those object-representations that are decidedly visual, and those that are 
tokened downstream in cognition at the action-planning stage. The former are impli-
cated in those segmentation and grouping processes that parse the scene into units that 
are fit for tracking; they also serve as inputs into mechanisms of object recognition, as 
well as other cognitive mechanisms. Thus, even if object-representations of the cognitive 
variety have determinate extensions, it does not follow that the object-representations 
tokened upstream in vision do as well—that was one of the morals we drew from §1.4.  
What about those cases in which the subject successfully performs an action on an 
ordinary object without recognizing it? For instance, D.F. can pick up objects she fails 
to recognize: it is just that her impairment causes her to do so in non-functional ways 
(Carey, Harvey & Milner 1996). For example, she might pick up a hammer from the 
wrong end. Is it that, in such cases, her action is mediated solely by those visual object-
representations that are tokened upstream of object-recognition? And if that is the case, 
don’t these visual representations need to determinately represent the 3D-shape of the 
object she succeeds in picking up? I don’t see why.  
Suppose D.F. were to succeed in picking up the cup without recognizing it as such.  
As long as her visual system represents the cup’s facing surface as the facing surface of 
a 3D body of such-and-such a 3D-shape, this will suffice for her to form an appropriate 
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action-plan. The key point is that the action-plan must be informed by a state that rep-
resents the presence of occluded object-parts, and this is something we get with a state 
that picks out the facing surface of a 3D body, and represents it as such.    
 Moreover, even if one is not convinced by this reply, notice that the problem raised 
above does not go any way towards undermining the thesis that D.F.’s visual state is 
indeterminate as between the cup and its entire surface, where the latter is a particular 
that clearly has occluded (and graspable) parts.   
 So the first and second stages of visuomotor action are compatible with the visual 
inscrutability thesis. Consider now the third stage, which involves a carefully controlled 
execution of those motor-programs generated as a result of the planning stage. In the 
case of grasping the mug, this will involve fine-grained adjustments of things like finger 
flexion, orientating of the wrist, and so on (components of reaching-and-grasping that 
occur relatively late in the performance).    
Now, motor control is widely thought to be a largely dorsal stream process (implicat-
ing the parietal lobe); however, there is significant controversy regarding just how inde-
pendent it is from object-recognition and planning, which are widely thought to be ven-
tral stream processes. According to Milner and Goodale’s influential model (1995, 2006, 
2008), the dorsal processes responsible for control are largely independent of those ven-
tral processes that underlie object-recognition and planning. In other words, once proc-
essing within the ventral stream results in the selection of both (i) a target object, and 
(ii) a type of action to be performed on that object, execution of the plan (involving 
specific motor programs and control mechanisms) is given over to the dorsal stream. 
Critics have challenged this model, arguing that Milner and Goodale have underesti-
mated the degree to which control is mediated by ventral processing.24 For our pur-
poses, the most important challenge comes from those theorists who argue for the fol-
                                                
24 For instance, see Schenk & McIntosh (2010).   
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lowing combination of views: (i) control is mediated by conceptual representations, and 
(ii) those representations are thereby visual. If these two claims are correct then a famil-
iar worry arises: if object-concepts have determinate extensions, and visual representa-
tions deploy object-concepts, then visual representations are constituted by object-
concepts with determinate extensions.  
For instance, consider Wayne Wu’s (2008) argument for (i) and (ii). Wu starts by 
posing what he calls the Many-Many Problem: “there are typically many targets on 
which one can act, and for any target, there are many ways of acting on it.” (2008, 
1007) He elaborates as follows:  
 
On the motor side, there are multiple levels of selection. First, there are many types 
of movement (reaching, throwing, etc.), only one of which can typically implement 
the intention. Secondly, within that type, one token movement (with specific trajec-
tory, speed, force, etc.) must be selected and executed. Action requires that only rele-
vant visual information guide this concrete movement. Identifying a one-one map at 
this level of precision, however, is not the result of practical deliberation. (2008, 1008) 
 
What is it the result of then? According to Wu, it is the result of concept deployment:  
 
Consider using a corkscrew … During this process, multiple targets are presented and 
multiple manipulations of different parts of the corkscrew are needed. We are con-
stantly visually registering new information. It is not that we deliberatively form new 
intentions at each moment when additional information becomes relevant … Rather 
we focus on the relevant information because we actively parse an object, tracking 
properties by shifting visual attention, all in the service of an intention to open the 
bottle with the corkscrew. The intention is, in a sense, the vehicle that brings the 
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relevant concepts to bear, concepts that are then independently exercised throughout 
action. In such cases, the exercise of concepts is a part of the visual process of selec-
tion. These visual processes are conceptual. (2008, 1020–21) 
 
Why exactly does Wu claim that the concepts in question are deployed within vision? 
The basic thought is that—throughout action—concepts direct attention to those prop-
erties of the target object that are relevant to the action plan, including those stages 
that occur well after planning (i.e. those that concern control and the adjustment of 
specific motor programs) (2008, 1026).     
 I won’t assess Wu’s controversial claim that concepts are deployed within vision in 
the way he envisages. Moreover, I will even grant, for the sake of argument, that the 
concepts he appeals to have determinate extensions. For even if we grant both of these 
assumptions, it does not follow that the inscrutability thesis that I’m defending is false.  
 In order to see why, recall the evidence that we appealed to above in motivating the 
view that vision contains object-representations. In particular, recall the fact that the 
representations in question are tokened at those stages of visual processing that occur 
before capacities for object recognition are manifested. In fact, as we saw earlier, ordi-
nary subjects track objects in a way that is insensitive to their color-, shape-, size- and 
kind-properties: all that is required is that they retain cohesiveness, boundedness, and 
spatiotemporal continuity. This is important, for it shows that early visual processing 
produces object-representations before the relevant objects are subsumed under high-
level concepts, such as CUP and HAMMER. Thus even if Wu is right that objects are 
subsumed under high-level concepts within vision, it does not follow that the object-
representations tokened upstream—the ones that serve as inputs to object-recognition—
are constituted by the same high-level concepts. And if that is the case, it also does not 
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follow that the latter object-representations have the same (determinate) extensions as 
concepts such as CUP and HAMMER.25   
 
1.5.2 Biological constraints to the rescue?  
In addressing Quine’s inscrutability thesis, Burge provides an argument from action 
that is potentially at odds with the claims made above. According to Burge, certain bio-
logical factors have a constitutive role to play in the determination of perceptual refer-
ence—in particular, those that concern basic actions, such as eating, mating, and so on 
(2010, 292). The key claim is that  
 
… perceptual states are constitutively (partly) dependent for their representational 
content, not only on the environment’s causally impinging on individuals, but on in-
dividuals fulfilling basic whole-animal functions. The constitutive ground for this lat-
ter dependency lies partly in the role that perception and perceptual kinds play in 
explaining realizations of individual biological function—centrally, individual activity. 
(2010, 371).  
  
Applying this to Quine’s inscrutability thesis, Burge argues as follows:  
 
Bodies are more basic to biological explanations of most animals’ pursuits than tem-
poral stages, undetached spatial parts, or instances of universals (all as such). So bod-
                                                
25 This will be important below (in sect. 1.7, as well as chapter 2) when we come to consider 
the issue of object-seeing, for the visual states that determine which objects a subject qualifies 
as seeing are plausibly those states that mediate MOT and amodal completion, not the states 
that are tokened downstream in the service of object recognition. In brief, the reason is that one 
can see an object without recognizing it, but one cannot see an object without differentiating it 
from its immediate surroundings (and that’s what the processes of amodal completion and selec-
tion-for-tracking provide).   
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ies have prima facie priority in determining perceptual referents and contents. Most 
of the alternatives that Quine uses to suggest gratuitousness are ruled out by these 
sorts of considerations.26 (2010, 215) 
 
The biological constraints that Burge appeals to may well rule out some of Quine’s can-
didates, but do they rule out the facing surfaces of 3D bodies? Do 3D bodies have prior-
ity when it comes to assigning visual referents? Given our discussion of action-guiding 
vision above, it is very hard to see why they should.   
Even if we agree that grasping and eating an apple constitutes an action that fulfills 
basic whole-individual functions, that still leaves us with two equally good ways of as-
signing extensions to those visual states that inform the action-plan. According to one 
assignment, the visual representations in question pick out the facing surface of the ap-
ple and represent it as the facing surface of an apple-shaped body (with various oc-
cluded parts). According to another assignment, the representations in question pick out 
the entire surface of the apple, representing it as the surface of an apple-shaped body 
(with various occluded parts). According to yet another assignment, these representa-
tions pick out the apple itself. Nothing Burge says supports the view that the latter as-
signment puts us in a better position to explain how those states that are tokened fur-
ther downstream in action-guiding vision result in successful acts of object-
manipulation: acts that are crucial to individual biological function.27  
 
 
                                                
26 See Carey (2009, 99) for a similar argument.  
27 I take it that the same point applies to teleological theories of content (e.g. the kind of 
theory defended by Dretske 1986, 1988; and Millikan 1984, 2004). If the different reference-
schemes described above each put us in an equally good position to explain successful acts of 
object-manipulation, then I fail to see how appeals to natural selection and biological function 
will adjudicate between them.  
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1.6 Visual inscrutability and first-person access 
So far, I have been defending the thesis that visual reference is inscrutable by focusing 
on various capacities (both perceptual and cognitive). But what about first-person con-
siderations? Might it be that the inscrutability of visual reference can be ruled out via 
evidence garnered from introspection?   
Searle (1987) famously rejects Quine’s inscrutability thesis by appealing to the first-
person perspective:  
 
… we know from our own case that we do mean by ‘rabbit’ something different from 
‘rabbit stage’ or ‘undetached rabbit part’ … In all discussions in the philosophy of 
language and the philosophy of mind, it is absolutely essential at some point to re-
mind oneself of the first-person case. (1987, 126–7) 
 
Might we rule out the thesis that visual reference is inscrutable by heeding Searle’s ad-
monishment?  
Suppose the claim is that there is a phenomenological difference between visually ex-
periencing an ordinary object and visually experiencing just its facing surface, where 
this tracks a difference in content. The problem, though, is that it is not at all clear 
what the phenomenological difference might amount to. How could there be any differ-
ence in what it’s like to undergo a visual experience as of a blue sphere, and a visual 
experience as of the facing surface of a blue sphere? Moreover, even if there were a dif-
ference, how could we possibly tell? It is not as if we can cause a subject to undergo a 
visual experience as of a blue sphere, followed by an experience as of the facing surface 
of one, and then ask her whether there was a difference in phenomenal character.   
In any case, even if we set aside appeals to phenomenology, I doubt that introspec-
tion can serve the desired evidentiary role. For suppose introspection is a reliable source 
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of evidence concerning the extensions of our visual states? In that case, assuming visual 
states have indeterminate extensions, what would we expect our introspective judg-
ments to say about them?  
Consider a simple example. S is gazing at the tip of an iceberg, the majority of which 
is submerged under water. Given our assumptions that (i) there are various, equally 
acceptable, ways of assigning extensions to her visual experience, and (ii) introspection 
is a reliable source of evidence concerning the extensions of our visual states, it seems 
reasonable to expect that S’s introspective judgment will be sensitive to whichever in-
terpretation—among the group of equally acceptable ones—is rendered salient by her 
current interests. And that is arguably what we find.     
If I ask S to characterize her visual experience, and she has just been wondering 
about the three-dimensional shape of the iceberg—something that cannot be deciphered 
based on the shape of its tip—she might utter something along the lines of “I can only 
see the tip: it looks white and pyramid-shaped.” On the other hand, if S is merely con-
cerned with the location of the iceberg, it would be natural for her to report having a 
visual experience of the iceberg itself, not just the tip. For instance, she will say some-
thing along the lines of “I’m visually experiencing an iceberg as being over there.” Isn’t 
this variance among introspective reports what we would expect were there more than 
one acceptable way of assigning extensions to our visual experiences?   
Of course, the friend of determinacy might deny that introspective judgments of the 
kind given above are reliable guides as to the contents of perception: perhaps they fail 
to reliably distinguish between the contents of perception, and the contents of immedi-
ate perceptual belief.28 But if that is the case, why take them to be reliable guides as to 
                                                
28 See Pautz (2009) for some compelling arguments that we should not posit perceptual con-
tents on the basis of the kinds of reports given above. 
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whether visual reference is inscrutable? That is to say, why heed Searle’s advice and 
consult introspection in the first place?  
  
1.7 Is object-seeing inscrutable?    
If I’m right that visual reference is inscrutable, does it follow that it is indeterminate 
which kinds of particulars I see? More specifically, does it follow that there is no fact of 
the matter as to whether I see ordinary objects, or, just their facing surfaces?  
 One might try to avoid this consequence by denying that the facts concerning which 
objects S sees are fixed by the facts concerning which objects are referred to by her vis-
ual indexing system. Most obviously, one might appeal to the representations tokened 
downstream in the object-recognition system: if those representations have determinate 
extensions (and it is far from clear that they do!) then it might follow that S determi-
nately sees ordinary objects. The problem is that that object recognition is just not a 
plausible level of processing to appeal to in fixing the facts concerning what S sees: in 
brief, doing so would belie the fact that one can see an object without recognizing it: an 
issue I explore in much greater depth in chapter 2.  
Alternatively, one might try to avoid the consequence that object-seeing is inscruta-
ble by denying that the facts concerning which objects one sees are determined by the 
facts concerning which particulars one’s visual state represents, regardless of whether 
the states in question mediate MOT or processes downstream in objection recognition. 
For instance, perhaps we could adopt a purely causal theory of object-seeing: one that 
does not involve an appeal to what the subject’s state represents.29 The worry with this 
attempted dodge, though, is that the arguments for visual inscrutability offered above 
seem to apply with equal force to those accounts of visual reference—most notably, 
Pylyshyn’s—that fall under the umbrella of causal theories of seeing. In any case, rather 
                                                
29 Grice (1961) is the locus classicus of causal theories of perception.  
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than going into that issue further, I want to conclude this chapter by briefly suggesting 
that the inscrutability of object-seeing is compatible with folk intuitions—the dodges 
suggested above are therefore unnecessary.   
  
1.7.1 Indirect seeing and contextualism  
As I have already noted, it is widely held that we see ordinary 3D objects indirectly in 
virtue of directly seeing suitable parts of them. For instance, I see the iceberg in virtue 
of seeing its tip; I see the house in virtue of seeing its façade; and so on. According to 
Jackson (1977, 17), the in virtue of relation is not a causal or inferential one: it is the 
analysis of one fact in terms of another (but not vice versa).30  
If this kind of view is right then even if it is indeterminate whether my visual state 
picks out 3D object, O, and even if that implies that it is indeterminate whether I see O 
directly, it does not follow that it is indeterminate whether I see O tout court. This is 
because on each acceptable interpretation of my visual state, it either picks out O, or, it 
picks out part of O (e.g. its facing surface). Thus, on each interpretation, either I see O 
directly, or, I see it indirectly (in virtue of seeing one of its parts). On every acceptable 
interpretation, I thereby qualify as seeing O: what is varying with each interpretation—
and is therefore indeterminate—is the manner in which I see it. There is thus a real 
sense in which I determinately see O, even though it is indeterminate whether my visual 
state represents it. And that seems to do justice to the folk intuition that we can deter-
minately see ordinary objects.  
Of course, one might counter that the notion of indirect seeing is problematic (e.g. 
perhaps it has no explanatory power). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to address 
                                                
30 What qualifies as a “suitable” part? Jackson (1977, 17) claims that it must be “reasonably 
substantial,” without elaborating on what he means by this. Kriegel (2009, 225) claims that the 
directly seen portion must be “highly integrated” into the relevant object. I discuss these is-
sues—at length—in chapter 2.  
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that kind of concern; although, I am sympathetic to it.31 But notice that if the folk are 
committed to a notion of indirect seeing, then that is all we need to explain the intui-
tion that we determinately see ordinary objects. In any case, in chapter 2, I will argue 
that the folk notion of object-seeing is context-sensitive: that is to say, the folk are 
committed to the view that whether one sees O over and above its facing portion varies 
with the interests of ascribers. This paves the way for an alternative explanation of how 
the inscrutability of visual reference squares away with the folk notion of object-seeing.   
In order to see why, suppose that the folk ascribe states of seeing in a context-
sensitive manner. In that case, even if you think that the folk are mistaken—because 
the notion of seeing that does explanatory work in vision science is context-insensitive—
that does not change the fact that the folk go around ascribing states of seeing in this 
way.32 And if the folk do, in fact, deploy a context-sensitive notion of seeing, we have a 
ready explanation of why it might be that, intuitively, there are scenarios in which we 
qualify as determinately seeing ordinary objects; scenarios in which we qualify as deter-
minately see their facing portions; and other scenarios in which we qualify as determi-
nately seeing both. We can explain these intuitions because which option the folk go 
with in a given context depends on their interests as ascribers: relative to a given con-
text, it may well be true that the subject sees an ordinary object (e.g. the plane), as 
well as its facing portion (e.g. its tail); relative to another context, it might be that the 
subject only sees the object’s facing portion.    
The key point is that if the folk deploy a context-sensitive notion of object-seeing 
then, according to them, we determinately qualify as seeing objects, and we also deter-
minately qualify as seeing their facing surfaces: it is just that we only qualify as doing so 
                                                
31 See Phillips (2014) for worries about the explanatory impotence of the related notion of in-
direct representation.  
32 In fact, in chapter 2, I will argue that both the folk notion of seeing, and the one deployed 
in vision science, are context-sensitive.  
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relative to the relevant contexts. And this view is compatible with my claim that the 
visual reference is indeterminate as between objects and their facing surfaces. Which 
reference-scheme (among the group of equally acceptable ones) the folk go with will 
vary according to their interests as ascribers.  
 
1.8 Conclusion  
When it comes to thought and natural language, the thesis that we cannot determi-
nately refer to ordinary 3D objects is counterintuitive. Moreover, the literature on why 
it might be false is extensive. On the contrary, the thesis that visual reference is inde-
terminate has received far less attention. However, it is not nearly as counterintuitive—
if at all—and we should refrain from inferring the determinacy of perception from the 
determinacy of thought and language. In particular, we should resist the temptation to 
think that if reference is determinate at the level of language and thought, then percep-
tion is the source of that determinacy. It may well be that one of the key markers of the 
distinct between thought and perception is that, while the former determinately repre-
sents objects and their facing portions, the latter is subject to multiple, equally accept-
able, interpretations. 
 Having argued that visual object-representations are indeterminate, in the next chap-
ter I turn the focus more squarely onto object-seeing. In particular, I will elaborate on 
my contention that the folk deploy a context-sensitive notion of object-seeing, before 
arguing that the notion of object-seeing that earns its keep in the philosophy of percep-
tion and vision science is context-sensitive as well.   
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Chapter 2 
Contextualism about object-seeing 
2.1 Introduction   
At the conclusion of chapter 1, I suggested that if we construe the folk notion of seeing 
as context-sensitive then we can account for the folk intuition that we determinately see 
objects and their facing surfaces—the reason being that if contextualism about the folk 
notion is true, that allows us to say that there are contexts relative to which there are 
determinate truths of the form “S sees O.”  
In this chapter, I defend the view that the folk notion of object-seeing is, indeed, a 
context-sensitive one. Moreover, I argue that there are compelling reasons for thinking 
that the notions of object-seeing that earn their keep in the philosophy of perception 
and vision science are context-sensitive as well. In none of these cases can we talk about 
“the seeing relation”—at least, not in a way that isn’t tethered to the interests of an 
ascriber.   
I proceed as follows. In sect. 2, I present the primary source of evidence for the con-
text-sensitivity of the folk notion of object-seeing. Then, in sect. 3, I clarify the kind of 
context-sensitivity that this notion exhibits by contrasting it with the kind exhibited by 
those gradable terms (e.g. ‘tall’) that are widely seen as context-sensitive. Then, in sub-
sequent sections, I address the suspicion that the context-sensitivity of seeing-ascriptions 
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is merely a feature of ordinary language. More specifically, in sect. 4, I reply to Siegel’s 
(2006) contention that only a regimented, context-invariant, notion of object-seeing will 
figure in explanations of our capacity to form perceptual demonstrative thoughts. In 
sections 5 and 6, I argue that the notion of object-seeing that is deployed in vision sci-
ence—most notably, in explanations of multiple-object tracking—is a context-sensitive 
one as well.  
 
2.2 Initial evidence for context-sensitivity  
Consider the following cases. In each one, I describe two contexts: one relative to which 
it seems true to say that the subject sees the object in question, and another one rela-
tive to which it seems true to say that she does not.  
 
Hide-and-seek    
Suppose I’m playing hide-and-seek with Oscar. I’m hiding behind the couch, but the tip 
of my nose is sticking out the side, thereby revealing my whereabouts to him. He utters 
the following: “I see you: your nose is showing!” On the other hand, suppose Richard is 
watching us play. He is eager to find out whether it looks, to Oscar, as though I have 
lost weight. He asks Oscar, “Do you think he looks slimmer?” to which I interject, “Well, 
let me get up from behind the couch first! Oscar can’t see me right now: all he sees is 
my nose.”  
 
The close-up  
Suppose we are at a very crowded art gallery with Oscar. We have gone there to see a 
painting by a mutual friend, Laura. The gallery is so overcrowded that Oscar’s eyes are 
an inch away from Laura’s painting. You and I are wondering where Laura’s painting is, 
and so we phone Oscar from another part of the gallery. He replies, “It’s in the back 
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room on the left.” You question Oscar’s claim, to which he replies, “I know that’s where 
it is because I see it right now. It’s directly in front of my eyes!”    
On the other hand, suppose Laura comes over and sees Oscar’s position, one inch 
away from the painting. She is very eager to get Oscar’s opinion about it, and so she 
utters the following: “Oh, he can’t actually see it right now. He’s way too close! All he 
sees is that small red patch in the corner.”   
 
The cow show  
Suppose we are both in the audience at a contest in which our cow, Frida, is being 
evaluated. From the judge’s vantage point, every part of Frida is occluded except for 
her tail. You are very eager to see how Frida does in the contest and so you are an-
noyed that, from the judge’s vantage point, Frida is not in full view. You want proceed-
ings to speed up and so you utter, “Ugh! The judge can’t see Frida right now: she can 
only see her tail!” On the other hand, suppose the judge is counting the number of cows 
that are present; there are 10 in total, including Frida. Having seen Frida’s tail, she 
turns to her fellow judge and utters, “I can see all 10 cows. Let’s begin the contest.”33  
 
2.3 A contextualist account of the folk notion  
In each of the cases provided above, even though we have fixed the relations that hold 
between S’s visual experience and O, the truth-conditions of “S sees O” seem to be vary-
ing with the interests of ascribers. Thus if we take the cases given above at face value, 
what we get is the following basic view:    
 
(CS) The truth-conditions of a sentence, P, containing the verb ‘sees’ vary according 
to the context in which it is uttered, independently of whether P is ambiguous or 
                                                
33 For some similar cases, see Dretske (1969, 27) and Neta (2007).  
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contains other context-sensitive terms. The contextual feature that is responsible for 
this variance in truth-conditions concerns the interests of the person who utters P. In 
particular, the interests of the utterer determine whether seeing a given part of O is 
sufficient for the subject to count as seeing O itself.34 
 
There are at least three different ways to elaborate on (CS). According to the surprise 
indexical view, ‘sees’ is an indexical term, expressing different relations in different con-
texts of utterance (the utterer’s interest being the contextual parameter that determines 
the relation expressed). Alternatively, the hidden indexical view denies that ‘sees’ is in-
dexical: rather, there is a covert variable in the logical form of any sentence containing 
the term ‘sees,’ where that variable takes on different values in different contexts, de-
pending on the interests of ascribers. On the unarticulated constituents view, the lit-
eral/conventional meaning of a sentence, S, containing ‘sees’ falls short of determining a 
complete proposition: propositions conveyed by utterances of S thus have constituents 
that are not the values of any terms (overt or covert) in S. In what follows, I will re-
main neutral between these different ways of construing the context-sensitivity of 
                                                
34 Dretske (1969, 28) seems to have been the first to suggest a view along these specific lines, 
although he merely suggests it in passing without defending or clarifying the view in any detail. 
More recently, Neta (2007) has also defended a view along the lines of (CS); he too does not go 
beyond cases. Clarke (1965) defends a view that departs from (CS) in one important way. Ac-
cording to him, sees is a “unit concept.” A unit concept F only applies to O in a given context if 
O is the unit determined by that context, and it only applies to a certain amount of O (e.g. its 
facing surface) if that amount is the unit determined by the given context. It follows that if F 
applies to O in context C, then it does not apply to any part of O; whereas, if it applies to part 
of O then it does not apply to O itself. Thus, in the case of seeing, Clarke’s view is that if O has 
been singled out as “the relevant unit” then the subject counts as seeing O; whereas, if the facing 
surface of O, say P, has been singled out then the subject only counts as seeing P (not O). The 
problem with Clarke’s view is that it just does not fit the linguistic data. Seeing-ascriptions of 
the following sort are commonplace: “I see Bill and all of his toes”; “She saw the house and its 
beautiful façade.”  
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‘sees.’35 Instead, I want to focus on the nature of those interests that the truth-
conditions of seeing-ascriptions vary with. 
 
2.3.1 A scalar analysis? 
The fact that the ascriber’s interests are determining whether seeing a given part of O is 
enough for O itself to count as being seen invites a comparison with those gradable ad-
jectives that are widely seen as context-sensitive: e.g. ‘tall,’ ‘flat,’ and ‘empty.’ Take the 
term ‘tall.’ It is widely held that this predicate expresses different extensions relative to 
different contexts of utterance, because the latter determine different minimum values 
that O must take on a scale of height in order to count as being tall. For instance, in 
the context of a discussion about basketball players, 5'10'' does not count as tall, 
whereas, in the context of a discussion about jockeys, it does count as tall. This is often 
referred to as a scalar analysis, for we are explaining the context-sensitivity of ‘tall’ by 
positing a semantic link to a scale of height.36        
 Can we provide something like a scalar analysis for the context-sensitivity of ‘sees’? 
In answering this question, notice a key difference between the context-sensitivity of 
‘sees’ and that of gradable adjectives such as ‘tall.’ The difference concerns the fact that 
‘tall’ is semantically linked to a scale involving height, which goes hand-in-hand with 
constructions that specify and compare degrees of tallness; whereas, ‘sees’ does not seem 
to be semantically linked to a scale that measures how much the given object is seen, 
and as such, it does not permit constructions that specify and compare degrees of see-
ing. For example, on the only acceptable reading of “I see Venus a lot,” it conveys the 
proposition that I see Venus frequently: there is no reading on which it specifies the de-
                                                
35 See Cappelen & Lepore (2005) for a critical discussion of these different accounts of con-
text-sensitivity.   
36 See Kennedy (1999) for a detailed discussion of scalar analyses.   
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gree to which I see Venus.37  
 
2.3.2 The heterogeneity of ascribers’ interests  
Could it be that ‘sees’ is semantically linked to a scale that measures how much of the 
object in question is seen, where context determines the minimum amount required for 
the object itself to count as being seen?  
For instance, consider Jackson’s (1977, 19) claim that a subject sees O just in case 
she sees a “reasonably substantial” part of it. What counts as a reasonably substantial 
part? Plausibly, that is a context-sensitive affair. If my interests as the ascriber concern 
your whereabouts then your nose counts as a reasonably substantial part; whereas, if 
my interests concern your posture then your nose will not count as a reasonably sub-
stantial part. Is the notion of object-seeing that emerges from Jackson’s account there-
fore amenable to a scalar analysis?  
To be sure, there are felicitous constructions that specify and compare how much of a 
given object is seen. For example, we do say things like the following: “I can only see 
half of the moon”; “I see more of the moon than I could last night”; and so on. Unfortu-
nately, how much of a given object is seen does not seem to be the common factor that, 
relative to any given context, determines whether the subject counts as seeing the object 
itself. The interests at play are too heterogeneous for that to be the case.    
As an illustration, recall the example in which I’m hiding from Oscar behind the 
couch, nose protruding. Relative to my interest in finding out whether I look slimmer, I 
utter the following seemingly true sentence: “Oscar can’t see me: he only sees my nose.” 
But what if I were to maneuver myself into a position such that part of my belly, and 
                                                
37 It is for this reason that Stanley’s (2004, 2005) arguments against the view that ‘knows’ 
exhibits the same kind of context-sensitivity as gradable terms such as ‘tall’ do not threaten the 
contextualist account of ‘sees’ that I’m defending here.   
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that part alone, were now protruding? Moreover, suppose that enough of my belly were 
visible for a reliable judgment to be made about whether I have slimmed down. In this 
scenario it would seem true for me to say, “Oscar sees me.” But suppose I change posi-
tions once more, the result being that only the back of my head is visible. Moreover, 
let’s suppose that Oscar now sees more of me (by volume, weight, etc.) than he could 
when part of my belly was protruding. Does he count as seeing me now? Given my in-
terest in having my slimness assessed, I seem to speak truly in uttering, “Oscar can’t see 
me: he only sees the back of my head.”    
What this example shows is that context does not determine how much of O must be 
seen in order for O itself to count as being seen; rather, it determines which kind of part 
must be seen in order for O itself to count as being seen. Applying this to our example 
above, the claim is that relative to my context of utterance, S only counts as seeing me 
if my facing portion is the kind of object the seeing of which would enable S to deter-
mine whether I have lost weight.   
The same kind of problem besets Kriegel’s (2009, 225) attempt to pin down condi-
tions for when seeing part of O suffices to count as seeing O itself. According to Kriegel, 
if S sees X, and X is highly integrated into Y, then S counts as seeing Y. For instance, if 
I see the facing surface of an apple then I count as seeing the apple itself because the 
former is highly integrated into the latter. On the other hand, in seeing the apple I do 
not qualify as seeing the fusion of it and Kim Jong-un’s left shoe because the apple is 
not highly integrated into this fusion. Kriegel concedes that the notion of high integra-
tion is “vague and obscure”; however, he remarks that “something like the above analysis 
is probably right and more precisely expressible.” (2009, 227)  
 I agree that the notion of high integration is vague, but I also think it is likely con-
text-sensitive. Moreover, I think it is probably context-sensitive in the same way as 
gradable terms, such as ‘tall’ and ‘flat.’ For instance, suppose I’m in a living room con-
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taining a couch, various chairs, a coffee table, a lamp, and so on. Does the lamp count 
as being highly integrated into the arrangement of objects that is the living room? If my 
interest is in finding a comfortable place to sit then, presumably, I speak truly in deny-
ing that the lamp is highly integrated into the living room. On the other hand, suppose 
the living room I have wandered into is a movie set. Moreover, the set designer has 
painstakingly chosen where to place each object so as to realize her artistic vision for 
the relevant scene. Given her interests, it seems true for her to say that the lamp is 
highly integrated into the complex object that is the living room (at least, more inte-
grated than it is relative to my interests). 
 If I’m right that the notion of high integration is context-sensitive, it follows from 
Kriegel’s view that whether seeing part of O suffices for the subject to count as seeing O 
itself is a context-sensitive affair. In particular, it depends on the contextually deter-
mined standard for being highly integrated into, and whether the part in question meets 
that standard. For instance, if only the lamp is visible to you—perhaps you see it from 
afar through a window—then you count as seeing the room itself relative to the set de-
signer’s context of utterance. On the other hand, given my interest in finding a nice 
place to sit, you only count as seeing the lamp relative to my context of utterance.  
 Thus Kriegel’s view arguably commits him to contextualism about object-seeing. 
However, the problem is that the interests that determine whether the subject counts as 
seeing a given object often have nothing to do with degrees of integration. For instance, 
Oscar’s utterance of “I see you: your nose is showing” counts as true relative to the given 
context because his interest is in locating me. That is to say, all Oscar cares about is 
whether the part that he sees enables him to discern my whereabouts: whether that part 
is highly integrated into me is irrelevant for these purposes.  
 Thus the moral is as follows: the interests that the truth-conditions of ordinary see-
ing-ascriptions vary according to are a heterogeneous bunch, concerning matters such 
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as: the location of the object in question; which categories the object falls under; who 
the object is; whether the object’s aesthetic qualities can be appreciated visually; and so 
on. Any theory that implicates only one of these interests will therefore fall short of ac-
commodating the linguistic data.38 
 
2.3.3 Context-sensitivity and surface-seeing   
Up to this point, I have been arguing that whether seeing the facing portion of O suf-
fices to count as seeing O itself is a context-sensitive affair. What I have not argued for 
is the thesis that whether one counts as seeing the facing surface of O varies with the 
ascriber’s context. It is certainly tempting to think that if you count as seeing the facing 
surface of an ordinary object then this is a context-invariant fact about you. One way to 
express this tempting view is in terms of Jackson’s  (1977) distinction between direct 
and indirect seeing. Recall that according to Jackson, whenever one sees an opaque 3D 
object, one sees it indirectly in virtue of directly seeing its facing surface. Thus we can 
restate the view under consideration as follows: which objects we qualify as indirectly 
seeing is a context-sensitive affair; whereas, which objects we qualify as directly seeing is 
a context-insensitive affair. Tempting as it is, I think this view is mistaken.   
First, notice that we sometimes count as seeing a three-dimensional object without 
                                                
38 Peter Godfrey-Smith (2005) has argued that we should construe folk psychology as a 
model—in brief, a model is an idealized structure whose resemblances to the target system allow 
us to represent that system in a way that generates predictions and explanations of its behavior. 
Godfrey-Smith’s core claim is that when we engage in folk-psychological interpretation, we are 
not deploying a theory; rather, we are bringing a model to bear on the subject. Importantly, 
there are multiple construals of the model on offer (i.e. multiple ways to use the model as a rep-
resentation of the subject): which one we go with will depend on our explanatory/predictive 
interests as folk psychologists. I take contextualism about the folk notion of object-seeing to be 
compatible with Godfrey-Smith’s model-based account of folk psychology: given its amenability 
to different construals, it should come as no surprise that the folk psychologist’s model engen-
ders a context-sensitive notion of object-seeing. See Godfrey-Smith (2006) for a general discus-
sion of model-based strategies in scientific theorizing.  
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seeing its facing surface. For instance, suppose I’m looking at Mars in the night sky. It 
appears to me as a point of red light, and as such, I cannot make out any of its surface 
details. For example, when asked if I can see any of its craters or mountains I reply, “I 
can’t see its surface at all: it just looks like a point of red light to me.” Importantly, in 
denying that I see the surface, I do not deny that I see Mars itself—I assert that I see it 
“as a point of red light.” Thus it follows from cases like these that, as far as the folk no-
tion goes, we sometimes see three-dimensional objects without seeing their facing sur-
faces.  
 Is there a context in which I count as seeing the facing surface of Mars, even though I 
cannot see it as such? Suppose the facts concerning whether I can make out any of its 
surface details are not at issue for you. For instance, suppose you are explaining why it 
is that Mars appears as a point of red light to me. You explain how light from the sun 
is reflected from its facing surface, travels through space, and then through the Earth’s 
atmosphere to my retinas. In this context it seems true for you to say that I’m seeing 
the facing surface of Mars. After all, the light that passes through the atmosphere and 
impinges on my retinas was transmitted from Mars’ facing surface!    
 Another example: suppose we are driving in the countryside, looking for a house with 
a very famous façade. The original house was built in the 1820s, but the façade is the 
only surviving part: the rest of the house having been replaced over the years. I gaze 
towards the house on the horizon, which appears to me as a very small and indiscrimi-
nate brown blob. Given that our interest is in locating the famous façade, it seems true 
to say that I see it, even though I can’t make out any surface details. On the other 
hand, there are contexts in which it seems true to say that I don’t see the façade: for 
example, one in which the kind of wood composing the façade is at issue. 
What these kinds of cases show is that the context-sensitivity of seeing-ascriptions 
runs deeper than our initial formulation, (CS), allowed. Context does not just determine 
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whether the subject counts as seeing a given object, over and above its facing surface: it 
also determines whether she counts as seeing its facing surface in the first place.  
 
2.3.4 More evidence for context-sensitivity  
So far, we have been considering cases in which the truth-value of “S sees O” seems to 
be varying with the interests of ascribers. But the evidence for contextualism is not just 
limited to cases. For notice that if ‘sees’ really is context-sensitive then speakers should 
be able to make the relativity to specific interests explicit when required. For instance, 
take the context-sensitive adjective ‘flat.’ As Hawthorne (2004) has pointed out, if I say 
“That field is flat” and you challenge me by pointing out that the field has small holes in 
it, I will clarify—rather than retract my statement—by saying something along the lines 
of “What I was saying is that it’s flat for a football field.”  
 If we examine the linguistic devices that an ascriber has at her disposal whenever her 
seeing-ascriptions are challenged, it is clear that the contextually determined standards 
can be made explicit. For instance, suppose we are walking towards the Taj Mahal. I 
complain that I cannot see it yet. You challenge me by pointing to one of its spires and 
uttering, “Yes you can. That’s one of its spires!” In clarifying, I will say something like, 
“Yes, I realize that I can see one of its spires. What I was saying is that I don’t see 
enough of the Taj Mahal in order to appreciate its architecture.”  
 In addition to providing further support for the view that ‘sees’ is context-sensitive, 
the fact that we clarify seeing-ascriptions in the manner described above also under-
mines an obvious worry. According to this worry, when we deny that a subject sees an 
object (over and above its facing portion), we are just speaking loosely. For instance, in 
denying that I see the Taj Mahal (over and above one of its spires), I’m just speaking 
loosely. Strictly speaking, I do see the Taj Mahal because seeing part of an object is al-
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ways sufficient for seeing the object itself.39   
 The problem with the loose-talk approach is that it fails to take into account how we 
actually respond when our seeing-ascriptions are challenged. As was just pointed out, if 
my primary purpose is to appreciate the architecture of the Taj Mahal, and the only 
part that is not occluded is one of its spires, I will clarify by making my interests as 
ascriber explicit (in the way described above). What I will not say is that I was just 
speaking loosely. For instance, I will not say something analogous to what I would say if 
you challenged my utterance of “It’s 12:30pm” by pointing out that it is, in fact, 
12:33pm. In reacting to your challenge I will say something like, “Well, yes, I was speak-
ing loosely. I realize that the exact time is 12:33pm.”  
The fact that we clarify seeing-ascriptions in the way described above also under-
mines the worry that my utterance of “I can’t see the Taj Mahal” is false in all contexts, 
but that it seems true (in the given context) because I’m conveying a true implicature. 
What might that implicature be? In general, true implicatures are only fit to explain the 
appropriateness of a false utterance in cases of hyperbolae, irony, metaphor, or loose 
talk. For instance, it is appropriate to utter the false sentence “Smith is as fast as light-
ning” if the conversational context concerns whether Smith is a fast runner, because it 
implicates the true proposition that Smith is a very fast runner indeed. But in uttering 
the sentence “I can’t see the Taj Mahal,” I do not seem to be engaging in this kind of 
speech act at all—to put it in Gricean terms, I don’t seem to be flouting any conversa-
tional maxims.40 This is reinforced by the fact that when my assertion is challenged, I 
will clarify the proposition expressed by making my interests explicit: what I will not do 
                                                
39 Recall that Broad (1925, 149) and Moore (1953, 34) hold the opposite view: according to 
them, when the folk ascribe states of seeing ordinary 3D objects (over and above their facing 
surfaces) they are speaking loosely. Problems exactly analogous to those raised below apply to 
this version of the loose-talk approach.    
40 See Grice (1975) for a discussion of conversational maxims and the generation of implica-
tures.  
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is concede that I was being hyperbolic or speaking metaphorically.41        
 
2.3.5 Subject-sensitive invariantism?  
I have been arguing that which head-world relation ‘sees’ picks out varies with the in-
terests of ascribers. The view I’m defending is thus clearly analogous to standard ver-
sions of epistemic contextualism, according to which the extension of ‘knows’ varies with 
the interests of ascribers—there is no such thing as the knowing relation.  
 Now, one of the epistemic contextualist’s key opponents is the subject-sensitive in-
variantist. The subject-sensitive invariantist denies that the truth-value of “S knows 
that p” varies with the interests of utterers; however, she accepts that it varies with the 
interests of the subject, S. To put it another way, the subject-sensitive invariantist ac-
cepts that there is a unique knowing relation: it is just that she construes it as the rela-
tion that the subject, S, stands in with respect to a proposition just in case S meets the 
epistemic standard operative in her practical situation (not the utterer’s). In contrast, 
the epistemic contextualist claims that there are many knowing relations; ‘knows’ ex-
pressing different ones depending on the interests of the utterer.42 
 This invites an obvious question: why not adopt subject-sensitive invariantism about 
‘sees’?43 More specifically, why not adopt the view that there is a unique seeing relation: 
namely, the relation that a subject stands in with respect to an object just in case her 
interests are of the requisite sort (e.g. she is able to satisfy her interest in locating the 
object)? I think there are a number of reasons to favor contextualism about ‘sees’ over 
the subject-sensitive alternative.   
                                                
41 See DeRose (2009, 112–17) for a similar point in defense of the claim that the apparent 
context-sensitivity of ‘knows’ cannot be explained away in terms of implicatures.  
42 Proponents of subject-sensitive invariantism include Hawthorne (2004) and Stanley (2005). 
The view is sometimes referred to as interest-relative invariantism.   
43 Thanks to Gary Ostertag for pushing me on this issue.  
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 First and foremost, consider the initial cases that we used to motivate contextualism. 
For instance, take the scenario in which you are waiting—very impatiently—for Frida 
the cow to be evaluated by the judge. Given your interest in Frida’s being judged as 
soon as possible—coupled with the fact that the only part of Frida that is unoccluded 
from the judge’s vantage point is her tail—you seem to speak truly in uttering, “Ugh! 
The judge can’t see Frida at the moment: she can only see her tail!” On the other hand, 
the judge’s sole interest is in making sure that all of the cows are in the arena: she is 
not concerned with the identity and location of any specific cow just yet. The judge 
thus seems to speak truly in uttering, “I see all 10 cows now.”  
The contextualist has a very straightforward explanation of the fact that both utter-
ances seem true: they both seem true because they are both true—the truth-conditions 
of seeing-ascriptions being sensitive to the interests of the ascriber. The subject-sensitive 
invariantist, however, needs to tell a story about why your utterance is false, even 
though it seems true. And as we have already seen, the prospects for telling a story of 
this sort are dim—as I argued above, in cases of this sort, you certainly don’t seem to 
be engaging in hyperbolae, metaphor, irony, or loose talk.  
 In order to bolster this last point, consider how ordinary speakers go about ascribing 
states of object-seeing when ignorant of the subject’s interests. For example, suppose we 
are sitting next to one another on the bus, both looking out the window. From our 
common vantage point, the Empire State Building’s spire is the only part of it that is 
not occluded by other buildings. Now, suppose you don’t know me. Moreover, you are 
completely ambivalent about whether I’m a tourist or a local; whether I’m trying to 
locate the Empire State Building; whether I’m trying to appreciate its architecture; and 
so on. All you know is that its spire is visible to me, and that I’m looking directly at it. 
In discerning what I see, does your ignorance about my interests cause you to hesitate? 
For instance, will you hedge and say something like, “He sees the spire of the Empire 
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State Building, but I’m not sure whether he sees the building itself”? Presumably, you 
will not. If what is at issue for you is the location of the building, you will say that in 
seeing the spire, I see the building itself.  
Moreover, suppose I were to remove your ignorance by informing you that I’m gazing 
in the direction of the Empire State Building because I want to discern its architectural 
design, the materials it was made with, and so on. I therefore insist that I cannot see 
the Empire State Building itself: only its spire. In responding to this new information, 
you will not retract your statement: rather, you will employ the clarification technique 
discussed above. That is to say, you will clarify your initial statement by making your 
interests explicit: e.g. you might say, “All I was saying is that you see enough of the 
building to locate it.” In other words, you will utilize the same kind of clarification tech-
nique that you do when, for example, your flatness-ascription is challenged by someone 
who harbors interests that diverge from yours (e.g. you are a football player and your 
interlocutor is a surveyor).   
Another problem with subject-sensitive invariantism concerns ‘now you see it, now 
you don’t’ sentences. For instance, the subject-sensitive invariantist must commit to the 
truth of bizarre sentences, such as “He sees the Empire State Building now, but he 
won’t as soon as I get him to wonder about its architecture”; “She sees the cat right 
now, but she won’t once I ask her to identify its breed”; “Oliver sees me now, but if I 
can just get him to wonder about my weight, he won’t be able to see me anymore.” The 
subject-sensitive invariantist is committed to sentences of this kind being true because 
the subject’s interests can obviously vary over time, thereby altering what she counts as 
seeing, even though her vantage point remains constant.  
In contrast, the contextualist is not committed to the truth of ‘now you see it, now 
you don’t’ sentences, because the interests that determine the truth-conditions of seeing-
ascriptions concern the current interests of the utterer. For instance, if what’s at issue 
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for you right now—as the utterer—is the location of the Empire State Building, then 
your utterance of the following is just false: “Ben sees the Empire State Building now, 
but he won’t see it as soon as I get him to wonder about its architecture.” This utter-
ance is false because seeing the building’s spire suffices for locating it, and that is what 
your current interest concerns. It doesn’t matter if you will be interested in the build-
ing’s architecture five seconds after uttering the sentence above: the interest that at-
tended, and had a causal role to play in generating, your utterance of the sentence 
above solely concerned the building’s location.44    
Finally, notice that even if the truth-values of seeing-ascriptions vary with the inter-
ests of the subject, not the interests of the ascriber, this does not undermine my claim 
that there is no such thing as the seeing relation. The reason is that seeing-subjects of-
ten harbor interests that pull in different directions. For instance, suppose I want to 
locate the Empire State Building and appreciate its architecture. Given my vantage 
point, the first interest is being satisfied, whereas, the second is not. If we are subject-
sensitive invariantists, what are we to make of this kind of situation?  
According to the subject-sensitive invariantist, seeing is a three-placed relation whose 
argument-places are occupied by a subject, an object, and an interest. But in the case 
just described—which is far from being an exotic one—we have different interests gen-
erating different verdicts on what I qualify as seeing. Should we conclude that your 
statement of “Ben sees the Empire State Building” is neither true nor false? I don’t 
think this would necessarily be a problematic conclusion for the subject-sensitive invari-
antist to draw (no doubt, some will find it troubling). The point I want to make here is 
                                                
44 See DeRose (2009, 204–6) for a persuasive argument that the epistemic contextualist is not 
committed to the truth of analogous ‘now you know it, now you don’t’ sentences. His arguments 
carry straight over to the case of ‘sees.’ See Schaffer (2006) for some other arguments against 
(epistemic) subject-sensitive invariantism. 
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just that to draw this conclusion would be to relinquish the claim that there is a unique 
seeing relation: rather, what we would have are various equally acceptable candidates. 
For the contextualist, the ascriber’s interests determine which candidate is expressed by 
her utterance of ‘sees’, whereas, for the subject-sensitive invariantist, ‘sees’ is just inde-
terminate between the various candidates. Either way, we must discard the prejudice 
that there is a privileged seeing relation, and that is an important result.   
 
2.3.6 Looking ahead   
So there are compelling reasons for thinking that the folk deploy a context-sensitive no-
tion of object-seeing. Even still, I suspect that some readers will harbor the following 
kind of worry: “Your contextualist theory is not a theory of seeing per se: it is a piece of 
ordinary language philosophy, and as such, it merely tells us how the folk go around 
ascribing states of seeing. If we want to home in on a theoretically interesting notion of 
object-seeing, we should examine the various explanatory roles that, as theorists, we 
would want it to play. What’s more, there is no guarantee that the notion (or notions) 
we uncover will be context-sensitive.”   
 In what follows, I address this worry head-on by focusing on the explanatory roles of 
object-seeing. First, I assess explanatory roles that philosophers of perception have tra-
ditionally been concerned with. I then move on to an assessment of the notion of object-
seeing that earns its explanatory keep in vision science. In both cases, I argue that there 
are good reasons for thinking that the notions of object-seeing that emerge are context-
sensitive ones.  
 
2.4 Contextualism and the anchoring of de re thoughts    
One of the fundamental roles of object-seeing is to put us in contact with objects in the 
environment. For example, upon seeing the facing portion of a crocodile—which hap-
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pens to be its tail—suppose Roger acquires the thought, THAT IS A CROCODILE. 
Presumably, the demonstrative element of Roger’s thought refers to the crocodile, not 
its tail. What makes this the case? This is obviously a difficult question, but it is gener-
ally agreed that seeing an object partly explains the capacity to form perceptual demon-
strative thoughts about it. Is a context-sensitive notion of object-seeing fit to play this 
explanatory role?  
  
2.4.1 Siegel’s regimented notion of object-seeing  
Siegel (2006) seems to think not. According to her, if we are to home in on a notion of 
object-seeing that plays the explanatory role described above, ordinary language reports 
must be regimented, for they are “not exact guides to the sort of object-seeing at issue” 
(2006, 431). More specifically, they must be regimented in a way that removes any con-
text-sensitivity. In order to illustrate her point, Siegel provides the following example 
(2006, 432).  
Franco and Ray are at the docks, standing by a boat that is completely wrapped in a 
tarp. Someone informs them that it is the renowned Lady Windermere. Later that day, 
someone asks Franco about the color of the Lady Windermere, to which he replies, “I 
don’t know. I didn’t actually see her.” On the other hand, suppose Franco is asked 
whether the Lady Windermere has docked yet, to which he replies, “Yes. I saw her by 
the dock.”    
  Both of Franco’s utterances seem true. However, according to Siegel, this does not 
mean that the notion of object-seeing that explains our capacity for perceptual demon-
strative thought is context-sensitive. On the one hand, we could deny that Franco 
speaks truly on both occasions, on the grounds that “our best theories of object-seeing 
overrule our intuitive judgments about when ordinary utterances are true” (Siegel 2006, 
432). In other words, we could reject contextualism about the ordinary notion of object-
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seeing on the grounds that a context-sensitive notion is not fit to play (at least one of) 
the explanatory roles that we would want it to as theorists. Call this the revisionist 
view. On the other hand, we could 
 
… go to the other extreme and hold that the only theoretically useful notion of ob-
ject-seeing is one that is tracked exactly by ordinary language reports—and hence 
that whether S sees o depends on more than the factors held constant in the two ex-
amples given in the text. This second option is a threat to the option I favor only if 
the more restricted notion that I’ve zeroed in on is not a legitimate subject-matter for 
theorizing. But far from seeming illegitimate, the subject-matter I’ve defined is one of 
the central explananda in the theory of intentionality. (2006, 432) 
 
Call this the ambiguity view, for it says that the notion of object-seeing that explains 
reference-fixing for perceptual demonstrative thoughts is distinct from the ordinary con-
text-sensitive one. Does the ambiguity view have anything going for it? What about the 
revisionist view? In what follows, I argue against both.  
 
2.4.2 Contextualism and reference-fixing for demonstrative thoughts  
Why think that in telling a reference-fixing story for perceptual demonstrative thoughts, 
only a context-invariant notion of object-seeing will fit the bill? Perhaps the worry is 
that if the referents of my thoughts are determined by which objects I count as seeing, 
and which objects I count as seeing is a context-sensitive affair, it follows that which 
objects my thoughts count as referring to is thereby a context-sensitive affair as well. 
But is this inference a good one? For instance, if whether Roger counts as seeing the 
crocodile (over and above its tail) varies with the interests of ascribers, does it follow 
that whether his thought refers to the crocodile varies with the interests of ascribers 
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too?   
Arguably, it would be problematic if contextualism about object-seeing had this con-
sequence. Certainly, the truth-conditions of Roger’s thought—THAT IS A CROCO-
DILE—seem to concern the crocodile, not its tail. And it is no doubt counterintuitive to 
claim that my utterance of “Roger’s thought refers to the crocodile’s tail” is true relative 
to my context of utterance: if that were the case then Roger’s thought would count as 
false (relative to this context) on account of attributing the property of being a croco-
dile to the crocodile’s tail. Moreover, Roger certainly does not behave as if the tail is a 
crocodile: e.g., if we were to detach the tail and place it in front of him, he wouldn’t run 
away in fear of being bitten!    
 Fortunately, as contextualists about the truth-conditions of seeing-ascriptions, we can 
be invariantists about the truth-conditions of perceptual thoughts by appealing to a 
context-insensitive reference-fixing mechanism. That is to say, the invariantist about 
thought content can posit a mechanism that takes a visual experience as input—where 
that experience puts the subject into different ‘seeing’ relations relative to different con-
texts—and produces a perceptual thought with determinate, context-invariant, refer-
ents. How might a mechanism like this work?  
 An obvious option is to claim that Roger’s thought picks out the crocodile—not its 
tail—because it contains a complex demonstrative of the appropriate kind. For example, 
perhaps Roger’s thought is of the form, THAT ANIMAL IS A CROCODILE, where 
being an animal is a property instantiated by the crocodile, not its tail.45   
This is not the place to assess competing theories about what fixes the referents of 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts. The crucial point is that whichever mechanism we 
posit, there is no reason why it cannot fix the referents of perceptual demonstrative 
thoughts in virtue of context-invariant facts about the subject and her environment. For 
                                                
45 See Strawson (1959) for a version of this view.    
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instance, if we go ahead and provide an account that involves an appeal to complex de-
monstratives, then we can give a reference-fixing story that appeals to the ascriber-
independent facts concerning which properties are represented by the complex demon-
strative in question (e.g. the property of being an animal).46, 47  
 
2.4.3 Contextualism and the differentiation constraint  
So being contextualists about object-seeing does not necessarily undermine our ability to 
explain reference-fixing for perceptual demonstrative thoughts. But there are also posi-
tive reasons for thinking that the notion of object-seeing that does this explanatory 
work is a context-sensitive one.   
 In order to see why, consider Siegel’s own account of the notion of object-seeing that 
explains reference-fixing for perceptual demonstrative thoughts. Following Dretske 
(1969, 18–35), she defends the following condition:  
 
Differentiation condition: If S sees o, then S’s visual phenomenology differentiates      
                                      o from its immediate surroundings. (2006, 434) 
 
Siegel motivates the differentiation condition with examples in which the subject is not 
in a position to form de re perceptual thoughts about an object because it has not been 
discriminated from its immediate surroundings by her visual experience. She describes a 
                                                
46 There may well be reasons for thinking that which properties one represents (in thought or 
perception) is a context-sensitive affair. However, it is extremely plausible that the demonstra-
tive element of Roger’s thought refers to the crocodile, not its tail. Claiming that which property 
his thought counts as representing is a context-sensitive affair does nothing to alter that point. 
Thus, in order to avoid the worries mentioned above we still need to posit a context-invariant 
reference-fixing mechanism for his thought’s demonstrative element.   
47 For some non-descriptivist reference-fixing mechanisms that are compatible with the claim 
that we refer, in thought, to the objects we perceive in a context-invariant fashion, see Campbell 
(2002) and Dickie (2011).   
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case in which your friend, Franco, is doing stunts in the sky by suspending himself from 
invisible fibers. At present, he is dressed in red and so you can easily differentiate and 
thereby form de re thoughts about him (e.g. THAT IS FRANCO IN THE SKY).  
 On the other hand, suppose Franco were to paint himself blue, so as to blend in per-
fectly with the sky. Another subject, S, looks towards Franco. However, given that 
Franco is visually indistinguishable from his immediate surroundings, S’s experience 
does not put her in a position to form de re beliefs about him. As Siegel puts it, “S does 
not see Franco in the sense that matters, given the theoretical purpose of the notion of 
object-seeing that is at issue” (2006, 434).  
 Further support for the differentiation condition comes from a consideration of the 
action-guiding role of vision. As we saw in chapter 1, other than putting us into cogni-
tive contact with objects, another role of object-seeing is to put us in a position to per-
form actions on them—actions such as grasping, pushing, lifting, and so on. Unless see-
ing the cup on the table requires that I have visually differentiated it from its immedi-
ate surroundings, it is unclear how seeing it could explain my successfully picking it up.  
One might press against the thesis that seeing O requires differentiating it from its 
immediate surroundings by pointing out that an undifferentiated object can still have 
an effect on the phenomenology of one’s overall experience. For instance, even though S 
does not differentiate Franco from his immediate surroundings, Franco is still (partly) 
causally responsible for the fact that S has a visual experience as of a uniformly blue 
sky. The problem with this view, though, is that it merely gets at the notion of prop-
erty-seeing: S clearly sees the blueness that Franco instantiates, but that does not entail 
that she sees Franco himself. What explanatory payoff would we enjoy by insisting that, 
in addition to the blueness, S sees Franco himself?  
 Siegel’s differentiation condition is thus compelling, but is the notion of object-seeing 
that emerges a context-invariant one? In fact, there are two reasons why the notion that 
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emerges is likely context-sensitive. First, as Dretske has pointed out, the notion of dif-
ferentiation is likely context-sensitive itself:  
  
How much of D must be visually differentiated? How much of D must look some way 
to S? … In general, I think it is clear that one need not see every part of something 
to see it, nor need one see all of its surface or even all of one surface. How much of a 
thing S must visually differentiate in order to seen it is a question that, in the ab-
stract, divorced from the sort of thing he is seeing, and the circumstances under 
which he sees it, cannot be answered. (1969, 27) 
 
In clarifying what he means by this, Dretske goes on to say the following:   
 
The conversational context and one’s particular interests (where is it? what is it? is it 
a so-and-so?) will also affect the question of whether enough of D was seen to see D. 
(1969, 28) 
 
Of course, given the heterogeneity of ascribers’ interests (discussed above), we need to 
qualify Dretske’s remarks a little here, for the issue is not whether enough of D has been 
differentiated in order for it to qualify as being seen; rather, the issue is whether the 
right kind of part has been differentiated. In any case, the important point is that in 
addressing the question of which part of an object must be differentiated in order for 
the object itself to count as having been differentiated, we arrive back at the exact kind 
of question we started with. And the answer is exactly analogous to the one we gave: 
that is to say, whether differentiating part of O suffices for differentiating O itself is a 
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context-sensitive affair.48   
 How might the invariantist respond at this point? Might it be that the notion of vis-
ual differentiation in play is a regimented context-invariant one? One way of trying to 
substantiate this claim would be to cash out the notion of visual differentiation in repre-
sentational terms. For instance, perhaps visually differentiating O from its immediate 
surroundings amounts to tokening property-representations that are satisfied by O, but 
not its facing portion.  
 For instance, go back to the scenario in which, from Roger’s perspective, the croco-
dile’s tail is its visible portion. Call the 3D shape of the tail, T; and call the 3D shape of 
the crocodile, C. Perhaps visually differentiating the crocodile’s tail from its immediate 
surroundings requires visually representing the property of being T-shaped; while differ-
entiating the crocodile itself requires visually representing the property of being C-
shaped. If Roger only manages to represent the first property, he only sees the tail; 
whereas, if he manages to represent the second, he sees the crocodile itself. If we take on 
the plausible assumption that whether Roger’s visual system represents the property of 
being C-shaped, the property of being T-shaped, or both, is a context-invariant affair 
then it seems to follow that which objects he has visually differentiated is a context-
invariant affair as well.49  
                                                
48 There are, in fact, two ways for context-sensitivity to get a foothold here. First, given the 
arguments provided above, it is probably a context-sensitive affair whether visually differentiat-
ing a given part of O suffices to qualify as having seen O itself. For instance, does differentiating 
your hand from the couch (which you are hiding behind) suffice for me to count as seeing you? 
If what I have argued above is right, that will depend on the interests of the ascriber. Second, it 
is probably a context-sensitive affair whether differentiating a given part of O suffices to count 
as having differentiated O itself: that is to say, the notion of differentiation is context-sensitive.   
49 Once again, I will not argue for the view that which properties are represented in percep-
tion is a context-invariant affair. In brief, though, one reason for denying that it is a context-
sensitive affair is that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is plausibly consti-
tuted by those facts concerning which properties it represents. Given that the phenomenal char-
acter of my experience does not seem to vary with the interests of ascribers, this suggests that 
 71 
 The problem with this proposal, though, is that one can see an object even though 
one’s experience is illusory with respect to its color, shape, size, location, kind, and so 
on. In the right conditions, I might see the white house on the horizon as a small red 
disc; the 2D photo on the wall as a 3D person; the person over my shoulder as directly 
in front of me (where she is being reflected in the mirror); and so on. Visually misrepre-
senting the shape, size, color, kind and position of an object does not remove my capac-
ity to form de re thoughts about it: it is just that these thoughts will be inaccurate.   
 Are there any properties that I cannot get wrong if I’m to qualify as seeing the object 
in question? Plausibly, my visual system must distinguish figure from ground, and rep-
resent the presence of a cohesive, bounded, and spatiotemporally continuous object.50 
Unless seeing O requires that my visual system has effected these segmentation and 
grouping procedures, it would be mysterious how seeing O could put me in a position to 
form de re thoughts about it; it would also be mysterious how seeing O could put me in 
a position to perform successful actions on it.   
 Importantly, though, as I argued in chapter 1, it is doubtful that appealing to seg-
mentation and grouping processes will give us context-invariant notions of visual differ-
entiation and seeing. The reason is that both 3D objects and their facing portions count 
as cohesive, bounded, and spatiotemporally continuous particulars; therefore, which ones 
qualify as having been differentiated via processes of segmentation and grouping will 
likely be a context-sensitive affair. For instance, suppose I’m watching a car as it moves 
                                                                                                                                                       
which properties my experience represents does not vary in this way either. See Byrne (2001) for 
a discussion (and defense) of the view—often referred to as intentionalism—that the phenome-
nal character of a perceptual experience supervenes on its representational content. Causal-
informational theories (e.g. Fodor 1990, Prinz 2002), teleological theories (e.g. Millikan 1984, 
2004), and quality-space theories (e.g. Rosenthal 1991, 1999, 2005, 2010, in press) all explain 
how properties are represented in perception by appealing to ascriber-independent facts about 
the perceiver and her environment.  
50 This appears to be Burge’s view of seeing (2009, 31; 2010, 456).   
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along the horizon. Both the car and its facing surface are cohesive, bounded, and spatio-
temporally continuous particulars, and both are plausibly causes of my visual experi-
ence. Thus in order for my visual experience to qualify as having differentiated either 
entity from its immediate surroundings, something more is needed. But what other re-
sources do we have? If we appeal to representations of color, shape, size, kind or loca-
tion then we face a familiar problem: one can see an object, and thereby be in a position 
to form de re thoughts about it, even if one’s visual experience gets these features very 
wrong. If, on the other hand, we embrace contextualism about the notion of visual dif-
ferentiation, the problem does not arise in the first place. The reason is that if contextu-
alism is true then whether I have visually differentiated the car (or its facing surface) 
from its immediate surroundings will simply vary with the interests of ascribers. There 
is thus no need to search for elusive constraints on the notion of visual differentiation in 
play: constraints that would yield a unique head-world relation.  
 
2.5 Contextualism and vision science   
In assessing whether a theoretically fruitful notion of object-seeing is context-sensitive, 
so far we have examined capacities that are manifested downstream of vision. But what 
about those decidedly visual capacities that vision scientists are in the business of ex-
plaining? Do they permit context-sensitivity, or, is the notion of object-seeing that falls 
out of their explanations a context-invariant one? If the latter turns out to be the case 
then, once again, there are two options. According to the revisionist view, the conclu-
sion to draw would be that the folk commitment to context-sensitivity is mistaken. Ac-
cording to the ambiguity view, the conclusion to draw would be that the folk notion of 
seeing and the one that earns its keep in vision science are just different notions alto-
gether.  
 
 73 
2.5.1 Problems with the revisionist view 
The view that in order to ascertain what seeing is like we should uncover the notion 
that earns its keep in vision science figures prominently in the work of theorists such as 
Pylyshyn (2003), Burge (2010) and Block (2013, forthcoming). For instance, Block 
(2013, 180) claims that “in discussing seeing we should be focused on cutting nature at 
its joints.” But is the folk notion of object-seeing beholden to findings in vision science? 
More importantly, if it turns out that the notion of seeing deployed in vision science is 
context-invariant, will we have thereby found out that the folk commitment to context-
sensitivity is mistaken? I highly doubt it.  
 First, notice that if we are contextualists about seeing-ascriptions then that does not 
commit us to any special constraints on the internal vehicles that carry visual experi-
ences. In fact, the contextualist and the invariantist can agree on the nature of those 
internal states that put the subject into seeing relations with environmental objects. For 
instance, they can agree on whether visual states are discrete and symbolic (in accor-
dance with classical computational approaches to vision) or distributed (as proponents 
of connectionist models would have it).  
In general, it is very hard to see how findings in vision science could be marshaled in 
support of the claim that the ordinary notion of seeing expresses a unique head-world 
relation (irrespective of context). Consider two of the relations that, according to the 
contextualist, are expressed by ‘sees’ (relative to different contexts). There is the rela-
tion that only holds between a subject’s visual experience and the facing surfaces of ob-
jects. On the other hand, there is the relation that holds between a subject’s visual ex-
perience and the ordinary objects of which those facing surfaces are parts.  
The dispute between the contextualist and the invariantist does not concern whether 
these two relations do, in fact, hold between a normal perceiver’s experiences and ob-
jects in the world. Rather, the dispute concerns whether one, and only one, of these re-
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lations is expressed by the verb ‘sees,’ or, whether it varies according to the context. 
That being the case, if it turns out that explanations in vision science only invoke one of 
these head-world relations then, at best, that would support the view that the notion of 
object-seeing deployed in vision science is context-invariant. But that still leaves it 
completely open whether the folk notion is context-sensitive. In other words, if only one 
of the head-world relations described above earns its explanatory keep in vision science 
then that would merely provide a reason to adopt the ambiguity view. In order to sup-
port the revisionist view, the contextualist would have to be committing to substantive, 
and erroneous, claims about the nature of the perceptual vehicles and processes that 
underlie our visual experiences. And as I argued above, the contextualist takes on no 
such commitments. 
Might it be that the folk notion of object-seeing is a natural kind concept, and as 
such, its extension is fixed in a way that is independent of human interests? On this 
view, object-seeing would be akin to other paradigmatic natural kind concepts (e.g. wa-
ter), whose extensions are widely seen as being fixed by external relations to local sam-
ples: relations that obtain independently of the interests of humans.51 But what is the 
independent motivation for this kind of view? I have argued that the linguistic data 
support contextualism, and as such, any view according to which the extension of the 
folk notion is fixed in a way that is independent of human interests will fall short of 
accommodating the data. Even if we suppose there to be a unique head-world relation 
that is privileged by the explanations of vision scientists, this does not by itself settle 
the question of whether the folk notion picks out the same relation. 
 
2.5.2 The ambiguity view  
How might one argue for the view that, unlike the folk notion of seeing, the one de-
                                                
51 See Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1980).   
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ployed in vision science is context-invariant? In what follows, I will not argue against 
the ambiguity view per se, for it may well be that the folk notion of object-seeing and 
the one that earns its keep in vision science are both context-sensitive, even though they 
are, indeed, distinct notions (e.g. because they diverge in some of the explanatory roles 
they play). My aim will be the more modest one of arguing that the scientific notion is 
context-sensitive, regardless of whether it is the same exact notion as the folk one.  
 
2.6 Arguments for the context-sensitivity of the scientific notion   
Among the various head-world relations that we have discussed, is one of them uniquely 
suited to play the role of the seeing relation that earns its keep in vision science? I 
highly doubt it. More strongly, I think there are compelling reasons for thinking that 
which head-world relation the theorist invokes will depend on her explanatory interests.   
 
2.6.1 Individuating biological traits and individuating states of seeing  
In order to motivate the view that the vision scientist’s explanatory interests determines 
which ‘seeing’ relation she is invoking, I want to start by briefly considering the indi-
viduation of biological traits, for it is very plausible that: (i) this depends on the ex-
planatory context of the theorist, and (ii) similar considerations apply to the individua-
tion of states of seeing. 
There are three main ways to type biological traits:  
 
(1) Functional criteria: an object belongs to a given trait type just in case it per-
forms some function, F. For instance, the function of a lung is two-fold: it 
transfers oxygen from the atmosphere into the bloodstream, and it releases 
carbon dioxide from the bloodstream into the atmosphere. Something is typed 
as a lung only if it performs this two-fold function.  
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(2) Morphological criteria: an object belongs to a given trait type just in case it 
has the requisite morphological properties. For instance, an object is a lung 
just in case it is the right shape, color, and size.  
 
(3) Homological criteria: two objects belong to the same trait type just in case 
they have a shared ancestry. For instance, the lungs of homo sapiens and go-
rillas belong to the same type because they have a shared ancestry. 
 
The important point here is that token biological traits are typed differently depending 
on the explanatory task at hand. As an example, consider bats and birds. Their wings 
perform the same function, and their shapes are similar in relevant respects. If we were 
to individuate biological traits based solely on functional and morphological criteria, the 
wings of bats and birds would therefore qualify as belonging to the same type. However, 
the wings of bats and the wings of birds are not homologues: they have a different evo-
lutionary history. Thus if we were to individuate traits solely in terms of homological 
criteria, the wings of bats and birds would be seen as belonging to different types. 
 Given that there are different ways to type biological traits, it is widely held—in 
both biology and the philosophy of biology—that we should use different criteria, de-
pending on the explanatory context. If we are interested in explaining how birds and 
bats manage to propel themselves through the air then typing their wings in terms of 
functional criteria makes good sense. On the other hand, if we are interested in explain-
ing the specific differences in morphology between the wings of birds and the wings of 
bats, homological criteria will be central. The key point is that the explanatory interests 
of the theorist determine how the entity in question is to be typed: there is just no in-
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terest-independent way to do it.52    
 Now, as Nanay (2015) argues, if the individuation of biological traits is sensitive to 
the explanatory context, why shouldn’t this also be the case for the individuation of 
perceptual states?  
 
If the individuation of other biological traits depends on the explanatory project, we 
should expect that so does the individuation of perceptual states (see Matthen 1998 
for a similar point). Here is why: perceptual states are states in the perceptual sys-
tem, that is, in an evolved biological mechanism. And as the individuation of the 
states of other evolved biological mechanisms, like the systole and diastole states of 
the heart, the individuation of the states of our perceptual system is also sensitive to 
the explanatory project at hand. If we have good reasons to doubt that there is one 
and only one way of individuating the systole state of the heart, we also have good 
reason to doubt that there is one and only one way of individuating perceptual 
states. (2015, 327) 
 
In arguing that token perceptual states are individuated in a way that is sensitive to the 
explanatory interests of the theorist, Nanay focuses on the dispute between representa-
tionalists (those who claim that perceptual states are individuated in terms their repre-
sentational contents) and relationists (those anti-representationalists who think that 
perceptual states are to be individuated in terms of those objects that they put us into 
the perceiving relation with). Of course, that particular debate is not my concern in this 
                                                
52 See Nanay (2010b, 2011, 2012, 2015) for a defense of this view. For a context-insensitive 
approach to the individuation of species, see Devitt (2008, 2009, 2011). See Stanford (1995) for a 
defense of pluralism about species individuation.  
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chapter.53 However, notice that if the line of reasoning given above is correct, there is no 
reason why we should not extend it to the individuation of states of seeing. That is to 
say, why expect there to be a unique way to type head-world relations into seeing and 
non-seeing varieties? There are a host of different head-world relations that we can ap-
peal to in specifying which objects a given subject counts as seeing in manifesting her 
(various) visual capacities: which one the theorist picks out will be determined by 
whichever interests are engendered by the specific capacity she is seeking to explain.  
Now, I do not take this to be anything like a dispositive argument. Nonetheless, I do 
think that it provides prima facie support for the view that the notion of object-seeing 
deployed in vision science is a context-sensitive one. In any case, I want to bolster the 
argument now by focusing on the visual object-tracking system: an evolved mechanism 
that we share with many nonhuman animals. I will argue that which head-world rela-
tion the theorist invokes in explaining successful instances of object tracking will depend 
on her explanatory interests, just as the considerations given above predict.   
 
2.6.2 MOT and explanatory interests   
As was explained in chapter 1, Pylyshyn (2001, 2003, 2006, 2007) has argued forcefully 
that ordinary subjects track objects via the assignment of visual indexes in early vision. 
For present purposes, the important point is that Pylyshyn regards the regimented no-
tion of object-seeing that falls out of his account of multiple-object tracking as a theo-
retically fruitful one, even if it departs from the ordinary notion of object-seeing which, 
according to him, fails to “cut nature at her joints” (2003, 51).   
 It is certainly plausible to construe the relations that hold between visual indexes and 
tracked objects as object-seeing ones. As was argued above, one of the core features of 
object-seeing is that one can see an object without representing its color, shape, size, 
                                                
53 In chapter 3, I take up the related issue of whether perceptual content is object-dependent.  
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kind or location accurately. However, one must visually discriminate an object from its 
immediate surroundings in order to qualify as seeing it: lest we end up with an explana-
torily vacuous notion of object-seeing. Fortunately, the notion of object-seeing that falls 
out of Pylyshyn’s account of MOT meets these criteria: one can track an object without 
getting its color-, shape-, size-, and kind-properties right; and tracking an object re-
quires that early vision has discriminated it from its immediate surroundings (I elabo-
rate on this issue in more detail below).54  
 For these reasons, I agree with Pylyshyn that there is a theoretically fruitful notion 
of object-seeing according to which one sees an object just in case one’s visual system 
has assigned a visual index to it. But does it follow that this notion is context-invariant 
(unlike the ordinary notion)? I highly doubt it.     
In order to see why, notice that—as with any causal or informational theory of refer-
ence—there are several causal stories to tell about which environmental particulars are 
referred to by visual indexes. Suppose I’m tracking a car that is passing me by. My vis-
ual system maintains causal contact with the car itself; with its facing surface; with its 
undetached parts; and so on—that was the moral of chapter 1. Of course, we could try 
to privilege one (or some combination) of these candidates by putting constraints on 
which causal relations (holding between visual indexes and tracked objects) are the ref-
erence-conferring ones. Needless to say, the track record of such attempts is pretty dis-
                                                
54 As far as I’m aware, Pylyshyn does not explicitly discuss cases in which the subject tracks 
an object, despite the fact that its location is visually misrepresented. Clearly, though, cases of 
this sort do occur. For instance, just consider a scenario in which you are tracking a fish from a 
boat: your visual experience misrepresents the exact location of the fish, due to the distorting 
effect of the water, but you still keep track of it as it moves.  
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mal, and as I have argued in chapter 1, they are not motivated by relevant empirical 
data.55    
 Perhaps we could avoid these causal indeterminacies—without relinquishing the view 
that visual indexes track objects without encoding their colors, shapes, sizes, locations 
or kinds—by abandoning a purely causal theory and adopting the kind of view (dis-
cussed above), according to which an object is only seen if it has been visually differen-
tiated from its immediate surroundings. In the context of Pylyshyn’s visual indexing 
view, the analogous claim would be that a visual index picks out an object (partly) in 
virtue of the fact that it has been differentiated from its immediate surroundings. In 
fact, in some places, Pylyshyn seems to endorse this very view:  
 
(1) early visual processes segment the visual field into feature-clusters … and (2) re-
cently activated clusters compete for a pool of four to five visual indexes (2001, 146) 
 
Elsewhere, Pylyshyn states that MOT 
 
operationalizes the notion of ‘primitive visual object’ as whatever allows preconcep-
tual selection and MOT. Note that objecthood and object-identity are thus defined in 
terms of an empirically established mechanism in the human early vision system. A 
certain (possibly smooth) sequence of object locations will count as the movement of 
a single visual object if the early vision system groups it in this way—i.e. if it is so 
perceived. (2001, 143–4) 
 
                                                
55 Grice (1961) is the locus classicus of causal theories of perception. See Gates (1996) for a 
compelling argument that that no purely informational-causal account of reference (be it percep-
tual or cognitive) can avoid the kind of indeterminacy described above.  
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In other words, the conception of objecthood operative in explanations of MOT is a thin 
one: all that is required for a particular to count as an “object”—in this thin sense of 
term—is for it to be a bounded, cohesive, particular that traces out a continuous path. 
Ordinary 3D bodies and their facing surfaces both count as objects in this sense of the 
term, and thus there is nothing to choose between them as far as fixing the reference of 
visual indexes goes.56    
 We are thus back where we were above, armed with a differentiation condition that 
does not determinately distinguish between 3D objects and their facing surfaces: both 
seem like equally good candidates. And if we try to adjust the differentiation condition 
by appealing to visual representations of color, size, shape, and so on, we face the prob-
lem discussed above: namely, one can see an object without one’s visual experience get-
ting its color, shape, size, kind or location right. In any case, we have already seen that 
MOT proceeds independently of these kinds of representations.    
For all these reasons, I think that it is probably a fool’s errand to seek out the seeing 
relation that figures in the selection and tracking of objects. There is just no such thing. 
Rather, what we have is a set of equally good candidates, and only pragmatic considera-
tions will determine which one the theorist invokes on any given occasion. As an illus-
tration, reconsider the case in which I’m watching a car as it travels along the horizon. 
What is it exactly that the relevant index picks out? Does it pick out the car itself? 
Does it only pick out its facing surface?  
What I’m suggesting is that which option the theorist goes with will depend on her 
explanatory interests. If the project involves explaining why I’m tracking whatever it is 
that I’m tracking, and this involves an appeal to the fact that I recognized the object on 
the horizon as a car, it would be natural to construe the car itself—not its facing sur-
                                                
56 See Clark (2006) and Dickie (2010) for similar points.  
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face—as the object picked out by my visual indexing system.57 On the other hand, sup-
pose the project involves explaining why I was unable to recognize the model of the car 
on the horizon—perhaps its facing surface was too nondescript for a match to be made 
with representations in long-term memory. In that case, it would be natural to construe 
me as only seeing, and tracking, its facing surface.   
Similar remarks apply to explanations of amodal completion. For instance, suppose 
you were confronted with the scene depicted below in figure 9:  
 
                                        
         Fig. 9  Partially occluded face 
 
Consider the claim that you saw the partially occluded face, over and above its visible 
portion: call the relevant relation seeing1. Contrast this to the claim that you only saw 
the visible portion of the face: call the relevant relation seeing2.        
If the theorist is concerned with facial recognition, and she wants to explain why it is 
that you were unable to recognize the man’s face (it is François Hollande’s), she will 
naturally construe you as having only seen part of his face, not the face itself (i.e. the 
theorist will invoke the seeing2 relation). On the other hand, if she is interested in the 
amodal completion of partially occluded surfaces, and she wants to explain how it is 
that you visually represented the visible portion of Hollande’s face as part of an oval-
                                                
57 It is well known that top-down attention can drive the selection of targets. See Pylyshyn & 
Annan (2006) for a discussion.  
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shaped surface, she will naturally construe you as having seen the face itself (i.e. she will 
invoke the seeing1 relation): whether you recognized this partially occluded surface as 
Hollande’s face is not a relevant concern in this explanatory context.   
 
2.7 Conclusion   
Recall the question we started with: when is seeing part of an object enough to qualify 
as seeing the object itself? I have defended a contextualist answer to this question. Im-
portantly, though, I have argued that context-sensitivity is not just a feature of the or-
dinary notion of object-seeing: it is a feature of the notion invoked in vision science, as 
well as the one invoked by philosophers of perception. In none of these domains can we 
talk about the seeing relation. Rather, which head-world relation the ascriber picks out 
will vary according to her interests. Heeding this fact is important, for if we fail do so, 
we are in danger of searching for a privileged relation where there is none. Moreover, as 
explained in chapter 1, going contextualist allows us to explain the folk intuition that 
we often count as seeing ordinary 3D objects, despite the fact that it is indeterminate 
whether we visually represent them (as opposed to their facing portions).    
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Chapter 3 
Object-seeing and the generalism versus particularism 
debate 
3.1 Introduction  
Imagine you are on a rickety bus. Your eyes are fixated on the man seated in front of 
you because the cup of coffee resting on his lap is about to get jolted off. Your experi-
ence of the cup’s color, shape, and motion is thus extremely vivid. If we grant the 
widely held view that perceptual states are representational then your experience plau-
sibly counts as representing the cup’s color-, shape- and motion-properties. But what 
about the cup itself? Does your visual experience represent it?58  
According to generalists, the content of a perceptual experience is completely inde-
pendent of the facts concerning which objects, if any, the subject perceives. Moreover, 
generalists maintain that as long as some object satisfies the general content of the ex-
perience, it thereby counts as accurate. Particularists disagree, claiming that whether 
the subject’s experience is accurate or not depends on whether she perceives any objects, 
                                                
58 Of course, not everyone accepts the claim that perceptual states are representational. See 
Travis (2004) for an argument against the representational view. For some recent defenses of 
the representational view, see Schellenberg (2011) and Nanay (2014). 
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and if so, how things are with those objects. In fact, particularists such as Tye (2009) 
and Schellenberg (2010, 2011) go even further, and construe the contents of perceptual 
experiences as being constituted by those objects, if any, that the subject perceives.   
Rather than endorsing one side of the debate, I want to argue for a third option that 
has been neglected in the literature. According to the view I will argue for there is no 
fact of the matter as to whether the objects we perceive are among the contents of our 
perceptual experiences. What generalists and particularists are providing us with are 
equally acceptable ways of assigning contents to our perceptual experiences. In particu-
lar, I will argue that there is a systematic stalemate between generalists and particular-
ists: whatever can be explained in terms an object-dependent content can be explained, 
equally as well, in terms of a purely general content, as long as the latter is supple-
mented by an appeal to a non-content-conferring perceiving relation.  
 Here is how I make my case. In sect. 2, I outline the varieties of generalism and par-
ticularism on offer. In sect. 3, I argue that generalists and particularists provide equally 
adequate explanations of phenomenology. In sect. 4, I argue that intuitions are unhelp-
ful when it comes to determining who provides the best account of the accuracy condi-
tions of perceptual experiences. Then, in sect. 5, I address the argument that we can 
only explain our capacity to demonstratively refer to objects in thought, as well as our 
capacity to acquire knowledge of those same objects, if we adopt a strong version of par-
ticularism. I argue that the generalist is, in fact, equally well placed to explain both ca-
pacities. In sect. 6, I defend the view that there is just no fact of the matter as to 
whether our perceptual experiences represent the objects we perceive. I then conclude 
by addressing two objections to the indeterminacy thesis. According to the first, we 
should favor generalism on grounds of parsimony. According to the second, we should 
posit two layers of content—an object-dependent layer and an object-independent one—
rather than a single layer of indeterminate content. I argue that neither objection is 
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compelling. Finally, in sect. 7, I explain why it is indeterminate, rather than a context-
sensitive affair, whether perceptual content is object-dependent.  
  
3.2 The basic varieties of generalism and particularism    
The key differences between the generalist and the particularist concern the ways in 
which they answer the following two questions: (1) Are the objects we perceive among 
the contents of our perceptual experiences? (2) Can we determine whether a perceptual 
experience is accurate or not without determining whether the subject perceives any 
objects?   
 
3.2.1 Generalism  
The generalist answers “no” to the first question and “yes” to the second. She answers 
“no” to the first question because she construes perceptual content as purely general. As 
McGinn puts it, “when we are describing the content of an experience we should not 
make singular reference to the object of the experience” (1982, 51). One way to express 
McGinn’s point is to deny that the contents of perception are object-dependent, where a 
content is object-dependent just in case that very content could only occur given the 
existence of a specific object.59, 60      
If the contents of perceptual experiences are purely general then what kinds of entities 
do they represent? The simplest answer is that the content of a perceptual experience is 
an existential generalization representing the instantiation of various properties. For 
instance, consider the following three experiences:  
 
                                                
59 Other generalists include the following: Lewis (1980), McGinn (1982), Harman (1990), Mil-
lar (1991), Davies (1992), Siewert (1998), Byrne (2001), Hill (2009), Brogaard (2010, 2011), and 
Jackson (2012a, 2012b).  
60 See Bach (2010) for a detailed discussion of what it is for a content to be object-dependent.  
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(1) S perceives a as having properties F, G, & H. 
(2) S perceives b (where b ≠ a) as having properties F, G, & H.  
(3) S undergoes a complete hallucination as of an object with properties F, G, & H. 
 
As far as our generalist is concerned, these are all cases in which the content of S’s ex-
perience is as follows: <(∃x)(Fx, Gx, Hx)>. What distinguishes (1), (2), and (3) from 
one another is thus a content-independent matter for the generalist. In particular, it is a 
matter of whether the subject perceives any objects, and if so, which ones she happens 
to perceive.   
Let’s turn now to the second question posed above: namely, can we determine 
whether a perceptual experience is accurate or not without determining which objects, if 
any, the subject perceives? Grice (1961) argues that there must be a causal dependence 
between an object and your visual experience in order for you to qualify as seeing that 
object. And even though many reject the claim that this casual dependence is sufficient 
for seeing an object, the claim that it is at least necessary is widely accepted.61 For our 
purposes, the important point is that if you are a generalist then accepting a causal con-
straint on seeing drives a wedge between the question of whether the subject sees any 
objects, and the question of whether her experience is accurate. Why? Because it could 
happen that the subject is having a completely hallucinatory experience, despite the fact 
that the experience’s content is satisfied by an object that the subject fails to perceive 
(due to the absence of the requisite causal relation). These kinds of experiences are re-
ferred to as veridical hallucinations. 
 
 
                                                
61 Proponents of a causal constraint on seeing include the following: Jackson (1977), Lewis 
(1980), McGinn (1982), Searle (1983), Millar (1991), Davies (1992), Tye (2009), Burge (2010), 
and Schellenberg (2010, 2011).  
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3.2.2 Particularism  
In contrast to the generalist, the particularist accepts the thesis that whether a percep-
tual experience is accurate or not depends on whether the subject perceives any objects. 
However, only some particularists endorse the stronger thesis that if the subject per-
ceives an object then that object enters into the content of her experience. Let’s call 
those particularists who take on this additional thesis, strong particularists.   
 
3.2.3 Strong particularism   
Take the first experience described above, in which our subject perceives a as instantiat-
ing F, G, and H. According to the simplest version of strong particularism, its content is 
the following Russellian proposition: <Fa, Ga, Ha>. Given that in the second case, the 
subject is perceiving a distinct object, b, her experience is construed as possessing the 
following distinct content: <Fb, Gb, Hb>.    
 What about the hallucinatory counterpart of these two experiences? If our subject 
fails to perceive any objects then the content of her experience cannot have any as con-
stituents.62 According to Tye’s singular-when-filled theory, the content of the subject’s 
experience contains gaps in the hallucinatory case, thereby rendering it inaccurate 
(2009, 548). Why inaccurate rather than neither true nor false? Tye (2009, 548) claims 
that construing the gappy content as inaccurate best fits the intuitive idea that in the 
hallucinatory case, the world diverges from the way it seems to the subject.63, 64 
                                                
62 I’m setting aside unusual cases in which the subject seems to hallucinate an object that she 
has perceived in the past (e.g. her mother). See Johnston (2004) for a discussion of these sorts of 
cases.  
63 Tye (2009) endorses the Russellian version of strong particularism. See Schellenberg (2010, 
2011) for an alternative approach according to which the content of a perceptual experience 
contains both modes of presentation of properties and “object-related de re modes of presenta-
tion” (2010, 38). Importantly, these object-related de re modes of presentation are such that in 
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3.2.4 Weak particularism  
Some proponents of particularism reject the strong variety and agree with the generalist 
that perceptual content is object-independent; however, unlike generalists, they are 
moved by arguments for the view that we cannot determine whether a perceptual expe-
rience is accurate or not without determining whether the subject perceives any objects.  
For instance, on Burge’s version of weak particularism, the content of a perceptual 
experience contains a demonstrative element (2010, 381). If there is no (appropriate) 
causal relation between this element and an environment particular, it fails to refer, and 
the subject thereby fails to perceive.65 However, Burge denies that the content of a per-
ceptual state contains a gap in those cases in which its demonstrative element fails to 
refer. Rather, the content of the hallucinatory experience is exactly the same as those of 
its successful counterparts. In each case, we have a demonstrative element, which hap-
pens to refer to an object in the successful case, and fails to refer to one in the halluci-
natory case (2010, 381–3). Burge thus rejects the strong particularist’s claim that those 
objects perceived by a subject are constitutive of her experience’s content.66   
 The one thing that weak and strong particularists obviously agree on concerns the 
accuracy conditions of perceptual experiences, for according to weak particularists, if the 
                                                                                                                                                       
the non-hallucinatory case, the subject’s experience has a token content that is constituted by 
the object(s) she perceives. In what follows, I set aside in-house disputes of this sort.  
64 In committing to strong particularism, Tye (2009) and Schellenberg (2010, 2011) are re-
jecting radical disjunctivism—in short, the thesis that perceptions and hallucinations do not 
share a common element. According to Tye (2009), perceptions and indistinguishable hallucina-
tions represent the same properties; whereas, for Schellenberg (2010, 2011), they are constituted 
by the same modes of presentation of properties and objects. See Schellenberg (2010, 27–31) for 
a compelling critique of radical disjunctivism. McDowell (1982) appears to have been the first to 
articulate the thesis.   
65 As we saw in chapters 1 and 2, Burge also holds that a perceptual state must accurately 
represent certain features of an object—in particular, its cohesiveness, boundedness, and spatio-
temporal continuity—in order to refer to it. Burge’s demonstrative-like elements are thus akin 
to complex demonstratives, e.g. “That F.”  
66 See also Bach (2007) and Soteriou (2000) for defenses of weak particularism.  
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demonstrative element of a perceptual experience fails to refer then the experience 
counts as inaccurate (2010, 381–3). Weak particularists thereby join strong particular-
ists in committing to the thesis that we cannot settle whether a perceptual experience is 
accurate or not without also settling which objects, if any, the subject happens to per-
ceive.67  
 
3.2.5 Adjudicating the debate  
How do we adjudicate the debate between generalists and particularists? There are four 
main ways in which theorists attempt to do so. One strategy is to argue that one side of 
the debate is best placed to capture the phenomenology of perceptual experience. A 
similar strategy is to argue that one side of the debate best captures the intuitive accu-
racy conditions of perceptual experiences. Other theorists take a different tack by focus-
ing on the role that perceptual experiences play in grounding singular thoughts about 
environmental objects. Similarly, some theorists focus on the role that perceptual expe-
riences play in grounding our knowledge of those same objects.   
 In what follows, I will address each strategy in turn, arguing that generalists and par-
ticularists are equally well placed to explain all of the relevant phenomena. Then, in 
sect. 6, I will offer a diagnosis of this stalemate, arguing that it is a systematic one. This 
will pave the way for my own view according to which there is just no fact of the mat-
ter as to whether the objects we perceive are among the contents of perception.  
                                                
67 Burge’s view bears obvious similarities to Searle’s (1983). Searle accepts the thesis that the 
content of a perceptual experience is not constituted by the object(s), if any, perceived by the 
subject. He also agrees that if the subject fails to perceive anything then her experience counts 
as inaccurate. However, he departs from Burge in denying that perceptual experiences contain 
demonstrative elements that refer to perceived objects (in successful cases). He is able to hold 
this combination of views because he posits a self-referential component in the content of a sub-
ject’s experience: “When I see a flower, part of the content of the experience is that this experi-
ence is caused by the fact that there is a flower there” (1983, 123). Thus, whether the experience 
as of a flower is accurate or not depends on whether a flower is successfully perceived.  
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3.3 Explaining phenomenology  
In theorizing about the nature of perception, one aspect that needs explaining is its 
phenomenology. Your experience of the coffee cup possesses a rich array of phenomenal 
features. For instance, there is something it’s like to experience the whiteness of the cup, 
as well as its shape and motion. In explaining these phenomenal features is there any-
thing to choose between generalism and particularism?  
 
3.3.1 The generalist’s argument from phenomenology  
In making the case for generalism, McGinn provides the following argument from phe-
nomenology:  
 
… the content of experience is not to be specified by using terms that refer to the ob-
ject of experience, on pain of denying that distinct objects can seem precisely the 
same: so when we are describing the content of an experience we should not make 
singular reference to the object of the experience …68 (1982, 51) 
 
What McGinn is arguably right about is that we can explain the subjective indistin-
guishability of two experiences in terms of a purely general content. The problem with 
his argument, though, is that we can also explain it in terms of the type of content pos-
ited by the particularist.   
In order to see why, consider the following subjectively indistinguishable experiences: 
in the first, you perceive O as a red sphere, one foot in front of you; in the second, you 
perceive numerically distinct object P as a red sphere, in the same location. So here we 
have two subjectively indistinguishable experiences, even though the subject perceives a 
different object in each case.   
                                                
68 See Davies (1992, 26) for a very similar argument.   
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 What is held constant across the two experiences, and what does therefore explain 
their subjective indistinguishability, are the facts concerning which properties each one 
represents as being co-instantiated (as well as where each one represents them as being 
co-instantiated). More specifically, it is the fact that each experience represents the co-
instantiation of redness and sphericality (at the same location relative to you, the sub-
ject) that explains why what it’s like to undergo the first experience is the same as what 
it’s like to undergo the second one. This is an important point: ordinarily, we do not 
undergo experiences as of uninstantiated properties (if ever). The fact that we do not is 
reinforced by pairs of subjectively distinguishable experiences, such as the following: (1) 
Your experience as of a red sphere in front and a blue square to the left, and (2) Your 
experience as of a blue sphere in front and a red square to the left. In order to explain 
why these experiences are distinguishable for you, we need to appeal to the facts con-
cerning which properties each one represents as being co-instantiated (as well as where 
they are represented as being co-instantiated).     
Thus if we are to explain both subjective distinguishability and subjective indistin-
guishability, we clearly need to posit perceptual contents that are rich enough to cap-
ture property co-instantiation. And the problem with McGinn’s argument is that the 
type of content posited by the particularist succeeds in giving us this explanatory pay-
off.    
Take the weak particularist’s claim that your experience as of a red sphere has the 
following type of content: <That is a red sphere, one foot in front>.69 Compare this to 
the type of content posited by the generalist: <There is a red sphere, one foot in 
front>. In both cases, redness and sphericality are represented as being co-instantiated 
(at a given location), and that is precisely what we need in order to explain what the 
                                                
69 In what follows, I will adopt the convention of having an English sentence in angled brack-
ets denote the Russellian proposition expressed by that sentence.   
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experiences have in common with their subjectively indistinguishable counterparts, as 
well as what they lack in common with their subjectively distinguishable ones.     
Notice that the explanation of subjective indistinguishability that I have just offered 
on behalf of the particularist does not commit her to object-dependent phenomenology, 
for it only appeals to those aspects of content that are shared between distinct tokens of 
the same type. Moreover, this point holds true regardless of whether the particularist 
construes these tokens along weak, or alternatively, strong particularist lines: either 
way, what we get is a type of content whose tokens all represent the co-instantiation of 
perceptible properties (at various locations).        
Of course, some philosophers have argued that phenomenology is, in fact, object-
dependent. In particular, some have claimed that our capacity to acquire demonstrative 
thoughts about environmental objects, as well as our capacity to acquire knowledge of 
those same objects, requires the existence of object-dependent phenomenology (e.g. see 
Campbell 2002). Schellenberg (2010, 2011) is a particularist who has recently provided 
arguments for the object-dependency of perceptual content—not phenomenology—by 
appealing to these very explananda. In sect. 5, I will argue that Schellenberg’s argu-
ments fail to motivate object-dependent perceptual content, though, and that the gener-
alist is equally well placed to explain the relevant phenomena. This will therefore double 
as an argument against the view that we must posit object-dependent phenomenology in 
order to explain these same phenomena.70    
So there do not seem to be any compelling arguments from phenomenology in favor of 
either generalism or particularism. In order to settle the debate we will have to look 
elsewhere. In the next section, I want to shift the focus to intuitions about accuracy 
conditions. 
 
                                                
70 See Mehta (2014) for a recent argument against object-dependent phenomenology.  
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3.4 Intuition pumps and accuracy conditions     
Do intuitions about the accuracy conditions of perceptual experiences favor one side of 
the generalism/particularism debate? More importantly, do intuitions of this sort have 
evidential value?  
 
3.4.1 The particularist’s argument from intuitive accuracy conditions  
In marshalling support for the view that perceptual experiences have particularist accu-
racy conditions, Tye (2009, 544) asks us to consider the following scenario. You are 
looking at a mirror, which, unbeknownst to you, has a yellow cube behind it—perhaps 
you fail to realize that you are looking at a mirror in the first place. Of course, you do 
not see this particular cube, but there is also a white cube over your shoulder that is 
being reflected in the mirror. In fact, the lighting conditions are such that this second 
cube looks yellow to you. Moreover, it also looks to occupy the very position that the 
first one does (behind the mirror). There is an intuitive pull to say that your visual ex-
perience is inaccurate in this case—more strongly, that it misrepresents the location and 
color of the cube that you see (i.e. the one over your shoulder). And that is just to say 
that there is intuitive support for particularism.71 
 
3.4.2 Problems with the argument from intuitive accuracy conditions  
There are two main problems with this way of arguing for particularism. First, the gen-
eralist will no doubt reply by focusing on cases in which intuitions pull in the other di-
rection. For instance, suppose you are hallucinating a banana. By sheer coincidence 
there happens to be one in front of you, matching the qualitative aspects of your experi-
ence right down to the smallest detail (e.g. color, shape, and orientation). Even though 
your experience is a complete hallucination, there is an intuitive pull to say that it is 
                                                
71 See Soteriou (2000) for a very similar case.  
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accurate nonetheless. After all, it “matches” the scene before your eyes perfectly—or so 
the generalist will insist.72 Importantly, the generalist will not deny that your experience 
is defective in this case: it is defective, albeit accurate, because you are successfully per-
ceiving neither the banana nor any other environmental objects. And as we saw above, 
the reason why the generalist can say this is because she is committed to a causal con-
straint on seeing.    
Thus when it comes to intuitions about accuracy conditions, we seem to have a 
standoff between the generalist and the particularist. This will be important below, in 
sect. 6, where I argue that even if we were to construe the kinds of intuition pumps 
given above as having evidential value, they would actually provide evidence for the 
indeterminacy view: not generalism or particularism.    
The second problem is that it is notoriously difficult to distinguish between the con-
tents of one’s perceptual experiences, and the contents of those immediate perceptual 
beliefs they tend to cause. This casts serious doubts on the reliability of the intuitions 
invoked above. For instance, the intuition that I am misrepresenting the location of the 
cube over my shoulder could very well be engendered by the fact that I am disposed to 
token perceptual demonstrative beliefs about it—beliefs that misrepresent its loca-
tion.73,74 By the same token, the generalist-friendly intuition that I can have accurate 
hallucinatory experiences could well be engendered by the fact that I am disposed to 
acquire true existential beliefs in the relevant scenarios. For instance, in the case de-
                                                
72 Tye (2009, 548–9) is a particularist who shares this intuition.   
73 I address the important question of how we acquire demonstrative beliefs about seen ob-
jects below, in sect. 5. Of course, the generalist will deny that we do so by undergoing percep-
tual experiences with demonstrative elements.  
74 The fact that intuitions are often unreliable when it comes to distinguishing between the 
contents of experience and the contents of immediate perceptual belief is further evidenced by 
the controversy over whether natural kind properties (e.g. being a pine tree) are among the con-
tents of perception. See Siegel (2011) for a detailed defense of the positive view. See Prinz 
(2013) for a reply.    
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scribed above, I am disposed to acquire the true belief that there is a banana in front of 
me, even though I fail to perceive the banana that is, in fact, in front of me.75   
 
3.4.3 Tye’s argument from looks reports 
So it appears unlikely that intuitions about accuracy conditions will help us to settle the 
debate between generalists and particularists. What about looks reports? Might they 
enable us to home in on the contents of perceptual experience? Tye certainly thinks so:  
 
The strongest support for the view that perceptual experiences have singular contents 
into which the seen objects enter is the thought that when we see those objects they 
look some way to us, together with the further thought that an object can only look 
some way if it is experienced as being that way. (2009, 554)  
 
The generalist can grant Tye’s plausible claim that when you see an object it looks some 
way to you. What she will deny is that either the contents or accuracy conditions of 
visual experiences are fixed by those of true looks reports. And she can happily deny 
this because she is already committed to the view that none of the causal relations hold-
ing between a subject’s token experience and the objects she sees are constitutive of ei-
ther the experience’s content or its accuracy conditions.   
For instance, take a simple case in which O looks red to you. There is nothing stop-
ping the generalist and the particularist from agreeing on what determines the fact that 
O looks this way to you. Plausibly, it involves your perceptual representation of redness 
standing in the requisite relation to O (i.e. the relation that constitutes your seeing of 
                                                
75 Tye (2009, 557) uses considerations of this very sort to explain away generalist-friendly in-
tuitions about the accuracy conditions of perceptual experiences (which he shares). But I fail to 
see why analogous considerations would not also cast doubt on the reliability of those intuitions 
that are marshaled in support of particularism.  
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O). What the generalist and the particularist must disagree on is whether O’s looking 
red to you guarantees that the content of your experience is (partly) constituted by O. 
And how do we go about deciding that issue? By assessing the relevant explananda (i.e. 
those considered elsewhere in this chapter), and determining whether they require us to 
construe the objects that we stand in the looks relation to as partly constitutive of our 
experiences’ contents. Without an independent argument for construing the looks rela-
tion as such, the particularist has no grounds on which to insist that the contents (and 
accuracy conditions) of visual experiences can be read off true looks reports.  
 Moreover, if we cannot settle the generalism/particularism debate by simply reading 
the contents of visual perception off true looks reports, the generalist has another com-
pelling explanation of those cases that seem to provide intuitive support for particular-
ism. Take Tye’s scenario in which the white cube over your shoulder looks yellow. The 
generalist can easily accommodate the fact that the cube over your shoulder looks yel-
low—even though it is white—by appealing to the fact that it is the cube that you see: 
you don’t see the one in front of you (behind the mirror) because the requisite causal 
relation is not instantiated. Tye claims that intuitions favor the view that your experi-
ence is inaccurate in this scenario; however, it is not clear why we should construe the 
intuition that is precipitated by this case as tracking the content of your experience, 
rather than just the content of the corresponding looks report, and if it is tracking the 
latter then the generalist can easily accommodate it. In other words, it seems plausible 
that the intuition pumped by Tye’s example is that the cube over your shoulder looks 
to have a property that it does not in fact have, and that is an intuition that the gener-
alist can readily accommodate.76 
                                                
76 Furthermore, Pautz (2009) argues—persuasively, I think—that we cannot read the con-
tents of perception off true looks reports, because doing so would trivialize other important de-
bates about the contents of perception: e.g. the debate over whether natural kind properties are 
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3.4.3.1 Tye’s reply  
Tye anticipates the kind of reply I just gave. More specifically, he considers a generalist 
who, in response to his argument from looks reports, defends the thesis that for O to 
look F is just “for O to cause (in the way involved in seeing O) an experience of an F” 
(2009, 558). Tye’s response is to offer what he regards as a reductio of this view. He 
asks us to imagine a case in which he sees two objects, a and b, such that a looks red to 
him, and b looks green:  
 
The object a causes my experience of something green, and it does so in the way in-
volved in seeing a. But equally, so does b. In seeing both a and b, I undergo an experi-
ence that represents something green, on the existential proposal. This experience, 
however, also represents something red. So b not only causes my experience of some-
thing red but it also causes my experience of something green, and it does so in the 
way involved in seeing b. So b looks red, but it also looks green. Clearly something has 
gone wrong. (2009, 559)  
 
According to Tye, what has gone wrong is that the generalist has “removed the seen 
object from the content of the experience involved in seeing it” (2009, 559).  
 But removing the seen object from the experience’s content is clearly not what has 
gone wrong in Tye’s example. On the contrary, what has gone wrong is the account of 
looks reports that he has suggested on the generalist’s behalf. As was mentioned above, 
according to Tye’s proposal, the generalist can adopt the view that for O to look F is for 
O to cause (in the way involved in seeing) an experience of an F (2009, 558). But why 
would a generalist want to accept this account of looks reports? In adequately capturing 
                                                                                                                                                       
represented in perception; the debate over whether perceptual states are representational in the 
first place; and so on.  
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the fact that b looks green, and not red, the generalists will want to appeal to the more 
fine-grained causal relation that holds between b and that part of her experience for 
which b is causally responsible (namely, the part that represents greenness, not redness). 
That is to say, the generalist should adopt the view that for O to look F is for O to 
cause part of the subject’s experience to represent an F. Adopting this approach enables 
her to adequately capture the fact that it is O that looks F (not some other object that 
is partly causally responsible for the experience, and that does not look F). It also en-
ables her to adequately capture the fact that O looks F (and does not look to have some 
other property that a distinct object causes her experience to represent).  
 In a footnote, Tye very briefly registers the fact that “further conditions could be im-
posed” to deal with his attempted reductio. He doubts that these conditions would help 
the generalist, though:  
 
… these conditions would require there to be a sensitivity in the relevant part of the 
content of the token experience to the relevant object. Given such a sensitivity, it is 
no longer clear that the object has not been smuggled into the content after all. (2009, 
559)  
 
Tye’s remarks are dialectically ineffective, though, for the generalist claims to have in-
dependent reasons for denying that any of the causal relations holding between a sub-
ject’s experience and objects in her environment are content-conferring ones: this is pre-
cisely what the appeal to the possibility of veridical hallucination is designed to show. It 
is for this reason that the account of looks reports suggested on behalf of the general-
ist—in terms of the particularly fine-grained causal relations that hold between certain 
parts of the subject’s experience and certain environmental objects—is not “smuggling” 
those objects into the content of the experience. If the possibility of veridical hallucina-
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tion provides a reason to deny a content-determining role for any of the causal relations 
that hold between a token experience and objects in the subject’s environment, then it 
obviously provides a reason to deny this role for coarse- and fine-grained ones alike. 
Tye’s worry is thus a red herring.  
 
For all these reason, I am highly doubtful that intuition pumps and looks reports can 
aid us in settling the debate between generalists and particularists. Thus, in the re-
mainder of this chapter, the focus will be on the explanatory roles that perceptual expe-
riences are widely seen as playing with respect to our cognitive and epistemological 
lives: roles that could provide us with the constraints on perceptual content that we are 
after. 
 
3.5 Demonstrative thoughts and knowledge of particulars  
One argument that has been proposed in support of particularism concerns our capacity 
to acquire demonstrative thoughts about the objects we perceive. For instance, Martin 
(2002, 182) states that generalism is “at odds with the simple thought that our experi-
ences ground demonstrative judgements about particular objects.” He goes on to add,  
 
As Moore was keen to stress, a glance at one’s desk may lead to the judgement, ‘That 
(directing one’s attention at one thing on one’s desktop) is an inkstand’. One is not 
stuck with merely the possibility of judging that there is some inkstand in the vicin-
ity, one can pick out the very inkstand in question and make a demonstrative judge-
ment about it.77 (2002, 182) 
 
But why exactly can’t we explain the capacity to acquire demonstrative thoughts about 
                                                
77 See also Campbell (2002), Brewer (2006), and Johnston (2006).    
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perceived objects if we construe perceptual experiences as having (object-independent) 
existentially quantified contents? In what follows, I will argue that the generalist is 
equally well placed to explain this capacity.  
 
3.5.1 The argument from the one-many  
The first argument is premised on the claim that the perceiving relation is plausibly 
one-many, as opposed to one-one. For instance, in seeing the banana you also see its 
facing surface. So what determines the fact that you are seeing both of these objects at 
the very same time? If you are a particularist, and you think that the objects we per-
ceive are demonstratively referred to by the experiences we undergo when we perceive 
them, there are two options. The first is to claim that the banana and its facing surface 
are referred to by distinct elements of your experience; on this view, the perceptual ref-
erence relation is one-one. The second option is to claim that these distinct objects are 
referred to by the very same element of your experience; on this view, the perceptual 
reference relation is one-many (i.e. it admits cases of plural reference). Let’s assess each 
option in turn.78   
The main worry with the first option is that none of the potentially reference-
grounding relations that hold between the banana and a given element of your experi-
ence appear to be ones that do not also hold between that very same element and the 
banana’s facing surface. For instance, suppose we were to construe the perceptual refer-
ence relation as a causal one, such that an element, X, of your token experience refers to 
an object just in case that object stands in the appropriate causal relation to X. But if 
the banana and its facing surface are both appropriate causes of parts of your experi-
ence, then it is very hard to see how they could fail to count as appropriate causes of 
                                                
78 I’m setting aside contextualism about object-perception for the moment. I explain how go-
ing contextualist affects the arguments I give in this section, below in sect. 3.5.6.  
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the very same parts. It is not as if the light that is reflected from the banana’s facing 
surface is received at a different part of the retina than the light that is received from 
the banana itself. Thus if we go with the view that the perceptual reference relation is a 
causal one, it is very hard to see how an element of your experience could refer to an 
ordinary object without also referring to its facing surface.      
 Arguably, a more promising approach is to construe the perceiving relation as a one-
many relation. For instance, if we construe it as a causal one then it is plausible that 
the element of your perceptual experience that puts you into the seeing relation with 
the banana, also puts you into the seeing relation with its facing surface. Moreover, 
there are good reasons for construing the seeing relation as a one-many relation even if 
we deny that it is a purely causal one, for it is widely held that to see the facing surface 
of an ordinary object just is to see the object itself. Thus, as long as an element of your 
experience puts you into the seeing relation with the banana’s facing surface, this same 
element thereby puts you into the seeing relation with the banana itself.79 
 We are now in a position to see why the fact that the perceiving relation is likely 
one-many, as opposed to one-one, makes the generalist and the particularist equally well 
placed to explain our capacity to token thoughts that demonstratively refer to the ob-
jects we perceive. Suppose we want to explain the fact that, having seen the banana, 
you were able to token the thought THAT IS A BANANA. If the particularist concedes 
that the element of your perceptual experience that picks out the banana also picks out 
its facing surface, then in order to explain how you acquired a thought that determi-
nately picks out the banana, and not its facing surface, some sort of reference-fixing 
                                                
79 Proponents of the thesis that we see 3D objects by seeing their facing portions include the 
following: Jackson (1977, 19), McGinn (1982, 54), McLaughlin (1984), Bermudez (2000), and 
Kriegel (2009, 225). 
 103 
mechanism needs to be posited: one that weeds out the unwanted referent (i.e. the ba-
nana’s facing surface).  
For instance, perhaps your thought determinately picks out the banana, but not its 
facing surface, because it contains the complex demonstrative ‘That B-shaped object,’ 
which contains a predicate (‘is B-shaped’) that is satisfied by the banana, but not its 
facing surface.80 This is not the place to weigh up specific accounts of what fixes the 
reference of perceptual demonstrative thoughts. The important point is that if the see-
ing relation is one-many then the particularist cannot claim that demonstratively refer-
ring thoughts simply inherit their referents from perceptual experiences via a straight-
forward causal dependence: some sort of semantic mechanism needs to work on the plu-
rally referring experience and home in on the relevant referent so as to produce a singu-
larly referring thought, and whatever mechanism that may be, it is one that the general-
ist can help herself to as well. At the very least, the onus is on the particularist to show 
otherwise.81  
 
3.5.2 The two-vehicle alternative 
Admittedly, I have not given a knockdown argument for view that the seeing relation is 
one-many, and there are certainly accounts of seeing that are potentially at odds with 
it. According to one such account, the seeing relation is a causal-cum-satisfactional one. 
More specifically, the view is that S sees O just in case (i) O is an appropriate cause of 
S’s visual state, V, and (ii) V is sufficiently accurate of O.82 If this account of seeing is 
correct then it may well be that the perceptual vehicle that puts the subject into the 
                                                
80 See Strawson (1959) and Dummett (1973, 1981) for versions of this view. 
81 In locating a semantic mechanism that does the job of homing in on just one of the par-
ticulars that is perceived by the subject (e.g. the banana, as opposed to its facing surface), the 
descriptivist approach is just one potential solution among many. For an account that is neutral 
between generalism and particularism, and that is also non-descriptivist, see Dickie (2011).    
82 See Burge (2010) for a version of this view.   
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seeing relation with the banana is distinct from the one that puts her into the seeing 
relation with its facing surface. Simplifying things a little, one vehicle might carry a 
content of the form, <That B-shaped body>, while the other carries a content of the 
form, <That F-shaped surface>, where being B-shaped is a property instantiated by the 
banana, and being F-shaped is a property instantiated by its facing surface, but not 
vice-versa. Call this the two-vehicle approach.83, 84  
 If the two-vehicle approach is workable, it paves the way for a view according to 
which demonstrative thoughts inherit their referents from the experiences that precede 
them in virtue of a straightforward causal dependence. More carefully, call the vehicle 
that perceptually refers to the banana (not its facing surface), B. And call the distinct 
vehicle that perceptually refers to the banana’s facing surface (not the banana), S. 
Given that B uniquely refers to the banana, this opens up the possibility of a view ac-
cording to which the demonstrative element of your thought refers to the banana, and to 
the banana alone, because it was appropriately caused by B. That is to say, there would 
be no need to posit a semantic mechanism that weeds out the unwanted referent (the 
banana’s facing surface) and homes in on the banana: that job has already been done by 
the vehicle that carries the 3D-banana-shape representation. Call this the inheritance 
view.  
                                                
83 One way of thinking about these vehicles is to construe them as occurring at different 
stages of visual processing: the vehicle that represents the property of being an F-shaped surface 
occurring at “the surface-based stage,” with vehicle that represents the property of being a B-
shaped body occurring at the “object-based stage.” See Frisby & Stone (2010, 155–204) for a 
discussion of relevant issues.   
84 The two-vehicle approach is not without its problems, for what is needed is an account of 
how the visual system produces representations as of 3D objects and distinct representations as 
of their facing surfaces. Needless to say, providing such an account is not an easy task, and the 
moral of chapter 1 was that it is a futile one: visual states are indeterminate as between 3D ob-
jects and their facing surfaces.  
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 In responding to the proponent of the inheritance view, there are two things that a 
generalist can say. First, if the proponent of the inheritance view can posit complex-
demonstratives in perception, why can’t the generalist make the same kind of move at 
the level of perceptual demonstrative thought? In other words, why can’t the generalist 
tell a reference-fixing story for perceptual demonstrative thoughts by construing them as 
carrying demonstratives with attributive elements: in particular, attributive elements 
that have a reference-fixing role to play? 
 In any case, it is not clear why the generalist cannot just give the same reference-
fixing story (for perceptual demonstrative thoughts) as the proponent of the inheritance 
view, minus the claim that the perceiving relation is a content-conferring one (with re-
spect to perceptual experience). The generalist is certainly free to adopt a causal-cum-
satisfactional theory of the seeing relation. What she will deny is that standing in this 
relation to an object amounts to perceptually representing it. Thus, having secured a 
perceptual vehicle—namely, B—that puts the subject into the seeing relation with the 
banana, and the banana alone, the generalist could follow the proponent of the inheri-
tance view by telling a reference-fixing story for the subject’s demonstrative thought by 
appealing to the very same causal dependence between B and the demonstrative ele-
ment of that thought.   
 
3.5.3 Contextualism (again)  
In chapter 2, I argued that whether we see objects, in addition to their facing surfaces, 
is a context-sensitive affair. So far, in responding to the argument from demonstrative 
reference, I have not been assuming contextualism. So how does the argument from de-
monstrative reference fare if we bring contextualism back into the picture?  
 In fact, I effectively addressed this question in chapter 2. There, I argued that the 
contextualist can provide an explanation of how it is that a subject, S, acquires demon-
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strative thoughts with context-invariant referents, by appealing to context-invariant 
facts about S and her environment. In particular, I pointed out that the contextualist is 
free to help herself to the kinds of resources described above. For instance, she could 
provide an account that appeals to complex demonstratives (in thought). The key point 
is that if we combine contextualistm with particularism, what we get is a view accord-
ing to which the referents of visual states vary according the interests of ascribers. 
Thus, if we are to tell a story about how perceptual demonstrative thoughts acquire 
context-invariant referents, we must posit a mechanism that homes in on the relevant 
referent; namely, a mechanism that appeals to context-invariant facts about the subject 
and her environment. And whatever those factors are, they are there for generalists to 
help themselves to.   
 
3.5.4 The strong particularist’s reply    
I have just argued that the particularist does not enjoy an advantage over the generalist 
when it comes to explaining the capacity to think, demonstratively, about seen objects. 
More specifically, I have argued that if the particularist provides an explanation of this 
capacity, the generalist can simply proffer the same explanation, minus the claim that 
the object seen is part of the given experience’s content. At this point, the strong par-
ticularist might reply as follows: “But surely, if we construe the seen object, O, as con-
stitutive of the given experience, we have a clear advantage when it comes to explaining 
how the demonstrative element of the resulting thought, T, acquired O as its referent: 
after all, T was caused by an experience that is constituted by O itself!”  
If what I have argued is right, the strong particularist’s insistence lacks dialectical 
force. What we need is an independent argument for the thesis that appealing to the 
perceiving relation does not suffice to explain how T’s demonstrative element acquired 
O as its referent, unless the perceiving relation is being construed as constitutive of the 
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experience that caused T, but no such argument has been forthcoming. The metaphysi-
cal question of whether perceptions are constituted by their objects seems orthogonal to 
the issue of how perceiving an object can engender demonstrative thoughts about it.         
In order to illustrate this point, consider the following analogy. We want to explain 
why Joyce has green eyes, and so we gather the requisite information about the color of 
her parents’ eyes, along with other relevant facts about their genes and physiology. 
Now, suppose we are having an argument on the side about whether a person could 
have had biological parents other than the ones she in fact has: you think that a per-
son’s biological parents are essential to them, whereas, I do not. Does this disagreement 
about whether Joyce could have had different parents have any bearing on our explana-
tion of how it is that she came to have green eyes? Presumably, it does not. We agree 
that Joyce’s eye color can be explained solely in terms of the fact that she was born of 
certain parents, with certain genetic constitutions, and so on. The issue of whether she 
could have existed with different parents is just irrelevant: it is a metaphysical side issue 
that must be decided on independent theoretical grounds.   
The same is true of the way in which we explain Joyce’s capacity to token thoughts 
that demonstratively refer to the objects she perceives. The full explanation of how 
Joyce came to token a demonstrative thought about O may well include an appeal to 
the fact that she perceived O. However, in giving this explanation, we don’t need to 
have settled the issue of whether Joyce could have had that very same experience—the 
one that actually put her into the perceiving relation with O—while being perceptually 
related to a different object. Like the issue of whether she could have been related to 
different parents, this is an issue that must be decided on independent theoretical 
grounds.  
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3.5.5 The epistemological argument   
I have just argued that the particularist does not have an advantage when it comes to 
explaining our capacity to acquire demonstrative thoughts about seen objects. But if 
that is the case, it becomes very hard to see how the epistemological argument even gets 
off the ground.   
Take Schellenberg’s (2011, 735–9) version of the argument.85 She begins with a simple 
example in which Anna sees a coffee cup and thereby gains perceptual knowledge of it. 
Plausibly, if she had perceived a distinct, albeit indistinguishable, cup she would have 
gained knowledge of that cup instead. According to Schellenberg, the generalist cannot 
explain Anne’s capacity to acquire these distinct pieces of knowledge:  
 
If her experience would be the same whether or not she were perceiving the particular 
coffee cup that she is in fact perceiving, it is not clear how her experience could 
ground knowledge of that particular coffee cup … (2011, 735) 
 
She goes on to add:  
 
… experience can only ground knowledge of particular objects, if the particular object 
to which the subject is perceptually related makes a constitutive difference to the ex-
perience. For only if experiences are individuated by their objects, can perceptual ex-
periences be the evidential basis of knowledge of particular objects. (2011, 735) 
 
According to Schellenberg, it follows that the strong particularist has an advantage over 
her competitors when it comes explaining the capacity to gain perceptual knowledge of 
environmental objects.  
                                                
85 See also Campbell (2002, ch 2).  
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However, in light of the reasons, adduced above, for thinking that generalists and par-
ticularists are equally well placed to explain the capacity to acquire thoughts that 
demonstratively refer to perceived objects, the generalist has a ready reply. Take the 
simple case in which Anne sees the cup and acquires the knowledge that that cup is 
white. How will the generalist explain Anne’s epistemological feat?   
 The generalist can start by explaining how perceiving the cup determined the fact 
that Anne’s subsequent thought demonstratively referred to it. Next, she can appeal to 
her preferred account of whatever additional ingredients must be in place for this de-
monstrative thought to count as a piece of knowledge. For instance, she might appeal to 
the fact that Anne has no reason to believe that she is undergoing a visual illusion; she 
might appeal to the reliability of Anne’s thought; and so on. The key point is that her 
experience does provide evidence for her belief that that cup is white. It is just that 
other ingredients—over and above her experience alone—must be in place for this belief 
to get elevated to the level of knowledge. It is not clear what, according to Schellenberg, 
is missing from this explanation. In order to secure an adequate evidentiary role for 
Anne’s experience, why must we commit to the additional claim that the cup is consti-
tutive of it?  
At one point, Schellenberg imagines a generalist replying to her argument by insisting 
that Anne’s knowledge of the cup is grounded in the causal relation that holds between 
it and her experience. Schellenberg raises the following worry about this approach: 
 
The problems with this causal strategy are the same as the ones that face any causal 
view of experience in general and any causal view of knowledge in particular … it is 
far from clear that causal relations can be analyzed such that they play an epistemo-
logical role. (2011, 737)  
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But why can’t the generalist just agree that causal theories of both experience and 
knowledge are to be rejected? For instance, if the generalist is moved by standard wor-
ries about deviant causes, why can’t she adopt the view that the seeing relation is a 
non-causal primitive one? The generalist could then construe this primitive seeing rela-
tion as grounding Anne’s singular thoughts about the objects she sees. It is just that it 
would not be construed as having any role to play in fixing the content of her experi-
ence.     
The question would then arise as to which of Anne’s singular thoughts count as 
knowledgeable ones, and if causal theories of knowledge are to be rejected then our gen-
eralist is free to adopt an alternative account of the ingredients that must be in place: 
she is certainly not wedded to a causal theory. For instance, there is no reason why our 
generalist could not adopt a virtue-theoretic approach to knowledge; a non-causal ver-
sion of the JTB theory; and so on. The onus is on Schellenberg to show that if we adopt 
anything other than a causal theory of knowledge, then Anne’s thought about the cup 
can only be construed as a knowledgeable one if her experience is constituted by the 
cup, and nothing Schellenberg says goes any way towards establishing this claim.86    
  
3.6 There is no fact of the matter   
In examining those phenomena that promised to settle the debate between generalists 
and particularists, a stalemate has emerged. In particular, a stalemate has emerged on 
                                                
86 Schellenberg (2011, 735) also mentions, approvingly, Campbell’s (2002, ch. 2) claim that 
perceptual experience grounds our knowledge of which particular objects our demonstratives 
refer to, and that in order to explain this capacity we must construe experiences as being indi-
viduated by their objects. Again, no argument been given for thinking that the subject’s experi-
ence must be constituted by the object perceived in order for this capacity to be explained. It is 
the fact that the subject’s experience is perceptually related to a specific object—namely, the 
one demonstrated—that is doing the explaining. Whether that perceiving relation has an indi-
viduating role to play is something that must be decided on independent theoretical grounds.     
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two main fronts.   
The first front concerns phenomenology. Generalists have traditionally been regarded 
as having the upper hand when it comes to explaining this aspect of perceptual experi-
ence; however, as I have argued, generalists and particularists are actually on an equal 
footing here.  
The second front concerns the roles that perceptual experiences play in grounding 
demonstrative thoughts about seen objects, as well as knowledge of those same objects. 
Particularists have traditionally been regarded as having the advantage when it comes 
to accounting for these roles. However, as I argued above, whenever the particularist 
explains some cognitive or epistemological capacity by appealing to an object-dependent 
content, the generalist can adopt the same explanation, minus the claim that the per-
ceiving relation is a content-conferring one (with respect to perceptual experience).   
This last point is reinforced by the fact that generalists and particularists can agree 
on what constitutes the seeing relation: perhaps it is a purely causal relation; perhaps it 
is a causal-cum-satisfactional relation; or perhaps it is a primitive one. The key point is 
that the perceiving relation is what puts us into cognitively rewarding contact with en-
vironmental objects, and it does so regardless of whether we construe it as a demonstra-
tive reference-relation, or, as a non-demonstrative relation that is coupled with an exis-
tentially quantified content.    
Moreover, it is important to realize that the kind of stalemate that we get is not one 
in which, on the balance of things, the evidence is neutral between generalism and par-
ticularism because the unique advantages enjoyed by one side are cancelled out by those 
enjoyed on the other. If that were the case, the most plausible conclusion to draw would 
be that more evidence is required. But that is not the kind of stalemate that we have 
reached. The kind of stalemate that we have reached is one in which both sides can ex-
plain phenomenology, and both sides can also explain how the perceiving relation puts 
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us into cognitively rewarding contact with environmental objects. It therefore appears 
unlikely that further evidence will break the deadlock. 
As an example, consider the claim that studies of multiple-object tracking provide 
evidence for particularism. In particular, consider Pylyshyn’s (2001, 2003, 2006, 2007) 
claim—outlined in chapters 1 and 2—that multiple-object tracking is realized by a 
mechanism that picks out targets and maintains referential contact with them via the 
assignment of “visual indexes”: singular elements akin to pure indexicals. A detailed as-
sessment of whether the data support Pylyshyn’s thesis is beyond the scope of this dis-
sertation. Nonetheless, I want to make two brief points.   
First, I see no reason why the systematic stalemate between the generalist and the 
particularist will not extend to the explanation of multiple-object tracking. In accom-
modating the data yielded from relevant studies, the generalist will just claim that the 
causal-tracking relations that obtain between a subject’s successive visual states and 
target objects are not content-conferring ones; rather, they are just successive instantia-
tions of the seeing relation. Second, even if one rejects this suggestion, the point remains 
that studies of multiple-object tracking do not allow us to adjudicate between strong 
and weak versions of particularism.   
For these reasons, I think we should embrace the conclusion that there is just no fact 
of the matter as to whether our experiences represent the objects we perceive. What 
generalists and particularists are providing us with are equally acceptable ways of as-
signing contents to our perceptual states. 
 
3.6.1 Intuition pumps and salient content assignments  
In order to illustrate the indeterminacy view I am defending, reconsider the kinds of 
examples that generalists and particularists typically use to pump intuitions about accu-
racy conditions. In the case of apparently veridical hallucinations, there is a temptation 
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to construe the subject’s experience as accurate, despite the fact that she does not per-
ceive any objects. On the other hand, there are cases in which the scene before the sub-
ject “matches” her experience, and yet she clearly misperceives some object (e.g. the 
cube that is reflected in the mirror in Tye’s example). In these latter kinds of cases, 
there is a temptation to say that the subject’s experience is inaccurate.   
So we have these different intuitions that seem to favor distinct ways of assigning 
contents and accuracy conditions to our perceptual experiences. However, rather than 
construing them as incompatible, I am arguing that we should construe them as com-
patible intuitions about distinct, albeit equally acceptable, ways of assigning contents 
and accuracy conditions to our perceptual experiences.   
 In particular, we should see the standard thought experiments that generalists and 
particularists appeal to as making different, albeit equally acceptable, content assign-
ments salient. When we are asked to imagine apparent cases of veridical hallucination, 
it has been made salient to us that there are objects positioned exactly where the sub-
ject’s experience says there are, instantiating exactly those properties that the subject’s 
experience says they instantiate, and so in this way, the generalist’s assignment of con-
tent becomes salient.  
On the other hand, when we imagine cases in which the subject clearly misperceives 
some object in her environment, the particularist’s assignment of content becomes sali-
ent. This is reinforced by the fact that we are accustomed to characterizing mispercep-
tions in terms of object-dependent looks (and sees-as) reports. For instance, we say 
things like: “That ball looks red to Roger, but it’s actually pink”; “Margaret is seeing 
Roger as located in front of her, but he’s actually off to her left”; and so on. When we 
are confronted with cases of visual illusion, it is thus natural to think of them in terms 
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of those object-dependent content assignments that are made salient by the relevant 
looks and sees-as reports.87  
 
3.6.2 The irrelevance of parsimony  
Could it be that generalism is to be favored on grounds of parsimony? Take two simple 
cases. In the first, you see b as F. In the second, you undergo a hallucination as of an F. 
The generalist will assign the following content to both of your experiences: 
<(∃x)(Fx)>. On the other hand, the strong particularist will assign the token content, 
<Fb>, to the first experience, and the token content, <F_>, to the second. Is the gen-
eralist’s content assignment more parsimonious than the strong particularist’s (I address 
the weak particularist’s below)? More importantly, if it is more parsimonious, does this 
have evidential value?   
It is controversial whether parsimony has evidential value in the domain of philoso-
phical theorizing, let alone in the hard sciences.88 Elsewhere, I have argued that appeals 
to parsimony in semantic theorizing are especially problematic (Phillips 2012). However, 
we needn’t introduce general worries about the role of parsimony in semantic theorizing 
in order to raise serious doubts about its suggested role in adjudicating the dispute be-
tween generalists and strong particularists.  
First and foremost, notice that the generalist and the strong particularist can agree on 
the following:   
 
                                                
87 As I argued above, what we cannot do is infer from the fact that there are true object-
dependent looks (and sees-as) reports, that perceptual content is object-dependent. To do so 
would beg the question against the generalist.  
88 See Huemer (2008) for an argument that ontological parsimony has no evidential value in 
what he calls “typical philosophical contexts.”   
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(1) The neurobiological complexity of the perceptual vehicles that carry the con-
tents of our perceptual experiences.  
(2) The causal relations that hold between perceptual vehicles and environmental 
entities.   
(3) What constitutes the perceiving relation.  
 
What the generalist and the strong particularist must disagree on is whether the per-
ceiving relation is a content-conferring one (with respect to perceptual experience). But 
in insisting that we construe the perceiving relation as content-conferring with respect 
to perceptual experience, the strong particularist is not thereby insisting that we admit 
an additional head-world relation into our ontology. Rather, she is insisting that we 
take a relation that both parties to the debate already countenance, and construe it in a 
certain way: namely, as a content-conferring one. Once we recognize this point, it be-
comes very hard to see how an appeal to parsimony could give us any reason to favor 
generalism over strong particularism (let alone weak particularism).      
 If the strong particularist were committing herself to more complicated perceptual 
vehicles than the generalist, or, if she were positing causal relations (between perceptual 
states and environmental entities) that the generalist does not, then perhaps the gener-
alist’s appeal to parsimony would be compelling. But as we have just seen, the strong 
particularist takes on no such additional commitments.  
Moreover, even if one remains convinced that generalism is to be favored over strong 
particularism on grounds of parsimony, it is important to keep in mind that the weak 
particularist provides a uniform assignment of contents to perceptions and their indis-
tinguishable counterparts. For instance, in each of the cases given above, the weak par-
ticularist assigns a token content of the form, <That is an F>, while the generalist pos-
its a token content of the form, <There is an F>. Thus even if considerations of parsi-
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mony provided a reason to favor generalism over strong particularism, they would not 
provide a reason to favor generalism over weak particularism. In other words, the inde-
terminacy view would remain the best choice: it is just that we would be restricting the 
equally acceptable content-assignments to those offered up by generalists and weak par-
ticularists. 
Finally, suppose we construe intuitions about the accuracy conditions of perceptual 
experiences as having evidential value. In that case, there is another way of replying to 
the worry about parsimony. For even if the generalist can lay claim to providing the 
most parsimonious assignment of contents to perceptions and their subjectively indistin-
guishable counterparts, that would only constitute a reason to favor generalism if there 
were not a third account that is more explanatorily powerful than both generalism and 
particularism. But if we take intuitions about accuracy conditions as having evidential 
value, then the indeterminacy view is just such an account, for it provides us with the 
most straightforward explanation of the fact that intuitions are pulled in the direction 
of both object-dependent and object-independent content assignments. Our intuitions 
are pulled in both directions because the content assignments in question are all equally 
acceptable—intuition pumps merely altering which assignment is the most salient. 
Given that the indeterminacy view provides the best explanation of our intuitions, con-
siderations of parsimony arguably do not get a foothold—or so the argument goes.89, 90  
                                                
89 Above, I suggested that we should not construe the relevant intuitions as having evidential 
value. However, some theorists will no doubt disagree with me on this issue. My point here is 
just that if we do construe the relevant intuitions as having evidential value, they will provide 
support for the indeterminacy view.  
90 Perhaps a case can be made for the claim that the standard versions of generalism and 
particularism I have been focusing on are to be favored over Searle’s (1983) account on grounds 
of parsimony, for recall that Searle goes beyond standard approaches and posits a self-referential 
component in the content of every perceptual experience. Addressing this issue in adequate de-
tail is beyond the scope of this dissertation: although, see Phillips (2014) for a discussion of 
problems surrounding the notion of indirect representation.    
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3.6.3 The multiple contents view  
Another worry for the indeterminacy view concerns the possibility that perceptual states 
possess multiple layers of content. In particular, why not adopt the view that perceptual 
experiences have two layers of determinate content—an object-dependent layer and an 
object-independent layer—rather than a single layer of indeterminate content? Call this 
the multiple-contents view (MCV). For instance, consider the version of MCV according 
to which your successful perception of b as F has two layers with the following contents: 
<(∃x)(Fx)> and <Fb>. In the hallucinatory case, the content of your experience would 
have the following two contents: <(∃x)(Fx)> and <F_>.91 Are there any compelling 
reasons to favor MCV over my alternative according to which your experience possesses 
a single layer of indeterminate content? I don’t see how there could be. 
The extra layer of content that we get with MCV does not give us any explanatory 
power that we do not already have with a single layer of content. For as I have argued, 
the generalist and the particularist both posit content-types that suffice to explain sub-
jective indistinguishability (as well as subjective distinguishability). Moreover, when it 
comes to the capacity for demonstratively referring thoughts, as well as the capacity to 
acquire perceptual knowledge of particulars, I have argued that we should adopt expla-
nations that are neutral between generalism and particularism. Thus when it comes to 
all of these phenomena, positing an extra layer of content will not give us any explana-
tory payoff that we do not already have with a single layer. So that just leaves the issue 
of accuracy conditions.      
Is it that we need two layers of content to explain our intuitions about the accuracy 
conditions of perceptual experiences? Take the issue of veridical hallucination. You are 
having a complete hallucination as of a blue sphere in front, and there happens to be 
one in the relevant position. MCV says that the object-independent layer of your expe-
                                                
91 Chalmers (2006) defends a version of the multiple-contents view. 
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rience is satisfied, but that the object-dependent layer contains a gap and is therefore 
inaccurate. Do our intuitions favor the view that your experience is partly accurate and 
partly inaccurate in this way? Even if we grant the controversial claim that intuitions 
have evidential value here—and I have suggested that they do not—I doubt that they 
are fine-grained enough to motivate MCV. I certainly harbor the intuition that your 
experience is accurate “in one way” and inaccurate “in another way.” That is to say, I 
am pulled in the direction of the purely general content assignment, and I am also 
pulled in the direction of the object-dependent one. But that underspecifies whether 
these different “ways” correspond to different layers of content, or alternatively, equally 
acceptable content assignments.     
Finally, even if the proponent of MCV managed to find a case in which, intuitively, 
the subject’s experience determinately possesses both accurate and inaccurate contents, 
at best that would provide us with a reason to augment our list of equally acceptable 
content assignments. That is to say, we would now have a reason to think that the con-
tent assignment provided by MCV is one of those equally acceptable assignments that 
can be made more or less salient depending on the intuition pump deployed.92  
 
3.7 Context-sensitivity vs. indeterminacy  
I have been arguing that it is indeterminate whether perceptual content is object-
dependent: why indeterminate, and not context-dependent? More specifically, as was 
the case with object-seeing, why not say that the notion of perceptual content is con-
                                                
92 Notice that, in the same way, claiming that “rabbit” is not referentially indeterminate be-
cause it determinately refers to both the set of rabbits and the set of undetached-rabbit-parts 
would not go any way towards undermining Quine’s (1960) inscrutability thesis. At best, it 
would just provide us with a reason to augment the list of equally acceptable extensions for the 
term “rabbit.” Thanks to David Rosenthal for some very helpful discussions of this issue.   
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text-sensitive: relative to some contexts, S’s state qualifies as having an object-
dependent content; relative to others, it qualifies as having a purely general content.  
 As was mentioned above in chapter 2, Bence Nanay (2015) defends a variant of this 
view; however, he is concerned with the more general debate as to whether perceptions 
are, fundamentally, relations to objects in the world as opposed to object-independent 
representational sates; whereas, I’m concerned with the in-house debate between those 
who agree that perceptual states are representational, but disagree as to whether their 
contents are object-dependent. Nonetheless, the worries I have about giving a contextu-
alist resolution to the generalism/particularism debate carry over to the more general 
debate that Nanay is concerned with.  
 As I see it, the problem with going contextualist—as opposed to indeterminist—
about the issue of whether perceptual content is object-dependent is that doing so would 
require us to uncover explananda that justify distinct content-assignments. That is to 
say, we would need to uncover at least one phenomenon, the explanation of which re-
quires us to posit an object-dependent content; and at least one phenomenon, the expla-
nation of which requires us to posit a purely general content. And that is just not what 
we have found. Rather, we have found that generalists and particularists are equally 
well placed to explain each of the relevant phenomena (e.g. phenomenology, the capac-
ity to acquire perceptual demonstrative thoughts, and so on).   
Contrast this situation to the case of object-seeing, which does, indeed, require us to 
assign different extensions relative to different explanatory contexts: for instance, recall 
that explaining the capacity for amodal surface completion requires us to invoke a head-
world relation that is different from the one that explains the capacity for facial recogni-
tion: the extension of the notion of object-seeing thus varies with the explanatory con-
text of the theorist, rather than simply being indeterminate. Given that the contents 
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offered up by generalists and particularists do not exhibit this kind of pattern, there is 
no justification for going contextualist, rather than just positing indeterminacy.  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
In examining key phenomena that we might expect a theory of perceptual content to 
explain, it has emerged that there is a systematic stalemate between the different con-
tent assignments provided by generalists and particularists: whatever the particularist 
explains in terms of an object-dependent content, the generalist can explain (equally as 
well) in terms of a purely general content that is paired with a non-content-conferring 
perceiving relation. I have argued that we should therefore abandon the widespread as-
sumption that perceptual content is either determinately general or determinately ob-
ject-dependent. Instead, we should embrace the surprising conclusion that there is just 
no fact of the matter. But why does this constitute such a surprising conclusion? Let me 
conclude by offering some brief diagnoses.       
 One reason that the kind of content indeterminacy I am positing may have gone un-
noticed is that it does not fall neatly into the categories of content indeterminacy with 
which we are most familiar. For instance, it is unlike Quinean inscrutability in several 
ways: most obviously, the indeterminacy that I have argued for does not involve fixing 
the truth values of sentences in a given language, and then varying the extensions of 
sub-sentential constituents in such a way that these truth values are preserved (Quine 
1960). The indeterminacy I am positing is also not the kind that many see vague terms 
as exhibiting. Nor is it the kind arguably exhibited by theoretical terms that have sur-
vived significant changes in the theories in which they are embedded (see Field 1973).   
Another possible reason why the kind of indeterminacy I am positing has been passed 
over is that many are likely assuming that if generalism and particularism both give us 
the same explanatory payoffs, then generalism is to be preferred on grounds of parsi-
 121 
mony. But as I have argued, it is very doubtful that parsimony can play this role in 
adjudicating the dispute, and even it could, it would only allow us to rule out strong 
particularism: we would still be left with the equally acceptable content-assignments 
offered up by generalists and weak particularists.  
This last point has implications for disputes about content well beyond the one I have 
engaged with in this dissertation. In weighing up apparently competing assignments of 
content to a given mental state or linguistic expression, we should be wary of appeals to 
intuition that are not bolstered by compelling accounts of why one of the assignments is 
more explanatorily powerful than its competitors. If a compelling account of this kind is 
not forthcoming, then it may be that what the theorist is faced with are equally accept-
able content assignments. And if we neglect this option then we are in danger of letting 
irresolvable disputes about content proliferate.      
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